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# LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE VIETNAM ERA

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
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## MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS

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
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A REPORT  
BY THE JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW BOARD

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As stated

PAUL H. RILEY  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Supply, Maintenance & Services)

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**CHAPTER I**  
**INTRODUCTION**

## CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

1. **BASIS FOR STUDY.** In connection with a review of worldwide logistic support of the U. S. ground, naval, and air forces during the Vietnam era (1 August 1965 to date), the Terms of Reference of the Joint Logistics Review Board require the examination of logistics systems in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these systems (i. e. , policies, procedures, organization, manpower, and controls). The Terms of Reference state that particular attention will be directed to "logistical personnel, including temporary duty (TDY) civil service support, training of military personnel, and contractor technical personnel." These subjects are receiving special attention in the overall review and in each of the functional areas under study. During the early stages of the review, it became apparent that use of military personnel in operational logistics had such a major impact on the effectiveness and responsiveness of logistic support in the Vietnam era that it warranted special treatment.

2. **STUDY OBJECTIVES.** The study objectives are as follows:

a. To examine major manpower policies and decisions, such as the decision not to call up Reserve forces, the civilianization program, establishment of 1-year tours, early release and service obligation, manpower ceilings, and Service capability to provide operational logistical support personnel in the Republic of South Vietnam in the numbers required.

b. To assess the impact of Vietnam requirements for military personnel in operational logistics upon the training base and upon provision of personnel to forces and activities throughout the world.

c. To outline and examine effects of the review and approval process developed by the Secretary of Defense for control of military manpower ceilings and programs in SE Asia.

3. **SCOPE.** This monograph focuses on use of military personnel in operational logistics. It reviews and evaluates the capability of Service manpower organizations to provide military personnel for operational logistical support of U. S. combat forces in South Vietnam from the beginning of the general force buildup (January 1965) to the present in order to determine responsiveness and to identify strengths and weaknesses of manpower policies, procedures, organizations, training, and controls as they pertain to military logistic support personnel. Special attention is given to the impact of the buildup in military logistical support personnel in South Vietnam, SE Asia, and the Western Pacific on worldwide military readiness. Where shortfalls in military logistic support personnel have appeared or Service policies have dictated use of TDY civil service personnel (civilian technicians, contract personnel, and/or third-country nationals) the pertinent facts are brought out; however, these aspects are not explored in great depth. Service and Defense Department policies, practices, and procedures are examined in relation to their effects on the provision of qualified military logistical support personnel to the operating forces, and particularly those in the combat area.

4. **ORGANIZATION OF THE MONOGRAPH.** Chapter II is concerned with major personnel policies and decisions as they affected provision by the Services of logistical manpower in support of combat forces. Chapter III outlines the process for generation of force requirements and the review and approval process by which the Secretary of Defense authorized augmentation of and changes to military forces in SE Asia. It is supported by two appendixes: Appendix A provides the historical background against which Program Deployment Plans are developed; Appendix B, "Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5," provides an example of these detailed programs.

**CHAPTER II**  
**MAJOR MANPOWER POLICIES AND DECISIONS**

## CHAPTER II

# MAJOR MANPOWER POLICIES AND DECISIONS

### 1. SERVICE MANPOWER CEILINGS

#### a. Department of Defense Guidance for Manpower Programs

(1) DOD Directive 1100.4. This Department of Defense (DOD) directive prescribes general manpower policy guidance for use by all Services in preparation of manpower programs. It establishes strengths to be used for programming, general policies, and instructions pertinent to the fiscal-year program under development.

(2) Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The DOD Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) is a planning and programming document that summarizes all DOD approved programs. It is the basic authority establishing military strengths. The FYDP prescribes the language and format in which changes to military strength are processed. It permits planning continuity and long-range implications visibility out to 8 years for forces and 5 years in terms of resource levels. As the foundation of the DOD Programming System, it relates resources (inputs) to programs (outputs). The FYDP structure provides a method for aggregating forces, money, and manpower. The Services used the FYDP as a point of departure and as a guidance document for developing policy, for planning, and for programming fiscal and manpower objectives. The Services use a formal Program Change Request (PCR) to obtain modifications in year-end manpower strengths as authorized in FYDP. During the Vietnam era, PCR's were processed by the Services on an individual basis as the need arose. The process subsumed all desired change and was one of continuous refinement of the FYDP in response to operational and political decisions as the conflict continued to grow in size and complexity.

#### b. Overall Service Manpower Ceilings

##### (1) Army

(a) The Army Force Development Plan (AFDP) is the principal Army instrument for planning changes to the FYDP. Its objective is to provide for the systematic attainment of an Army with a balanced structure of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and an overall balance between force structure, modernization, and readiness.

(b) The process of programming manpower begins with a comparison of the manpower resources available with the manpower requirements needed. This comparison is followed by the processes of allocation and distribution of the manpower. In the attainment of the basic manpower objective, it is necessary to make the most accurate possible determination of manpower requirements. Actual requirements often exceed available manpower, which is limited by the established Service ceilings.

(c) Following President Johnson's decision on 28 July 1965 to commit substantial U.S. forces to SE Asia without calling up the Reserves, the military personnel strength of the Army was increased by 235,000. This increased strength was to permit the activation of one division force, three brigade forces, a large number of helicopter companies, and their combat service support units, as well as to provide for additional logistics support and the expansion of the training base. Another 45,000 men were added to the Army by the January 1966 budget requests to round out the Army's Strategic Reserve and to support the possible deployment of additional forces to SE Asia, as well as to provide additional training, logistics,

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and personnel pipelines. For the first time since 1962 the Army's strength passed the million mark. Actually, by 30 June 1966 the Army had exceeded the January planned strength goals. The actual strength of 1,199,784, a substantial increase over that authorized, included 102,268 commissioned officers, 4,200 nurse and medical (officers) specialists, 11,318 warrant officers, 1,079,682 enlisted personnel, and 2,316 cadets.<sup>1</sup> During the years of the Vietnam buildup, Army manpower ceilings (authorizations) and active force end strengths (assignments) grew steadily, reaching a crest in early 1969. These increases are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1  
ARMY MANPOWER CEILINGS AND ACTIVE FORCE END STRENGTHS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
1965	961,000	969,066
1966	1,159,000	1,199,784
1967	1,442,000	1,442,498
1968	1,570,000	1,570,343
1969	1,511,000	1,512,169

Source: Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army Progress Report, 30 June 1965 - 30 June 1969 (U), (CONFIDENTIAL).

(2) Navy. Between 30 June 1964 and 30 June 1969, the authorized end strength of the Navy was increased by approximately 8,500 officer and 92,300 enlisted spaces. During this period over 38,000 spaces were allocated to new activities in SE Asia. Manpower ceilings and active force end strengths are shown by fiscal year in Table 2.

TABLE 2  
NAVY MANPOWER CEILINGS AND ACTIVE FORCE END STRENGTHS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned*</u>
1965	674,116	671,448
1966	740,598	745,205
1967	753,394	751,619
1968	768,265	761,457
1969	770,800	775,799

\*OCS (Officer Candidates and Midshipmen) are included in the total enlisted figures for on-board count.

Source: Department of the Navy, Representative of the Manpower Planning and Control Division, Interview held in November 1969.

<sup>1</sup>Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1966, 1967, pp. 4, 10, 21, 155.

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(3) Air Force. The Secretary of Defense did not always approve total manpower ceilings requested by the Air Force, but the disparity between the numbers requested and those finally approved by the Secretary has not been great. Even though the Air Force was unable to allocate spaces exactly as planned, the reductions made by the DOD were judicious and spread throughout the force structure and systems. Resultant ceilings reflected a proportionate and circumspect trimming of programs in relation to their size, operational decisions, realignment of forces outside of SE Asia, labor-saving technical advancements, and national political decisions. USAF manpower requests and military personnel ceilings approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are recapitulated by fiscal year in Table 3. In general, authorized ceilings have been adequate to meet Vietnam requirements.

TABLE 3  
AIR FORCE REQUESTED AND  
APPROVED MANPOWER CEILINGS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Approved</u>
1965	(Unavailable)	823,633
1966	(Unavailable)	886,350
1967	881,202	853,359
1968	908,948	887,100
1969	886,888	866,630

Source: Headquarters, United States Air Force, Memorandum, subject: OSD Response to Budgeted USAF Manpower Requirements (U), 2 January 1970 (SECRET).

### (4) Marine Corps

(a) The principal Marine Corps manpower effort during the 1965-1969 period was concentrated on expanding and sustaining the strength of committed forces in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) and activation of the 5th Marine Division. Approved upward adjustment in Marine Corps manpower ceilings during the Vietnam era reflect the heavy commitment of that Service (see Table 4).

(b) Table 5 illustrates the increases in Marine Corps end strengths from FY 65 through FY 69.

(c) Service Manpower Ceilings in South Vietnam. After June 1965, Service manpower ceilings in South Vietnam were established by the Secretary of Defense in a series of Program Deployment Plans described in detail in Chapter III of this monograph (see also Appendix B). The initial base was set at the in-country on-hand strength as of 31 December 1964. From that base date, all future personnel deployments to South Vietnam remained within ceilings periodically established by the Secretary of Defense. Concomitantly, the prescribed ceilings were a reflection of manpower requirements that the Secretary of Defense considered sufficiently justified to approve. The buildup of forces in Vietnam was influenced by many factors. Although contingency plans had been developed to counter the insurgency threat in SE Asia, these plans could not be implemented without qualification because of the political considerations involved in introducing U.S. forces into Vietnam. Thus, each deployment was the subject of considerable study, as discussed in Chapter III of this monograph. Detailed justification and rejustification was required to support requests for even the smallest units. The policy of 100 percent quantitative manning was common to all Services. One hundred percent qualitative manning was the desired goal within each Service, subject to the practical consideration of equitably distributing critically short skills and/or experience level. Qualitative shortages therefore did exist

occasionally in some places. Service in-country manpower ceilings were fluid and constantly changing. All services constantly adjusted their force structures to accommodate new ceilings as the numbered deployment plans underwent refinement and revision.

TABLE 4  
MARINE CORPS REQUESTED AND APPROVED MANPOWER CEILINGS

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Approved</u>
30 June 1965. Approved strength	193,190	193,190
December 1965. Initial buildup operations in SE Asia	85,169	85,169
September 1966. Additional manpower requirements to support SE Asia operations	21,569	14,564
September 1966. Personnel requirements for developing effective recruit/trainee flow	12,827	0
September 1967. Additional manpower requirements to support SE Asia operations	19,293	7,000
January 1968. Cancellation of early release program needed to improve recruit/trainee flow	10,300	0
Other transactions affecting FY 68 end strength	0	2,072
Total	342,348	301,895

Source: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Policy Analysis Division, Paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Enclosure 1, AOIC/jcf-13, 26 February 1968.

TABLE 5  
MARINE CORPS END STRENGTHS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965	17,258	172,955	190,213
1966	20,512	241,204	261,716
1967	23,592	261,677	285,269
1968	24,555	282,697	307,252
1969	25,698	284,073	309,771

Source: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Reference Notebook, Item II A-2-a/AOIC-cb-35, FY End Strength, 1937-Present, 1969.

## 2. MILITARY MANPOWER RESOURCES

### a. Adequacy

#### (1) Army

(a) Experience has shown that requirements for manpower usually exceed resources. The Army is faced continuously with unprogrammed requirements for new missions.

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Determination of the validity of the requirement must be made; selection of the source of manpower follows. Satisfying manpower requirements necessitates reduction in other commands and activities. The process is extremely time-consuming, administratively cumbersome, and creates a constant turbulence. Generally, it involves a number of emergency assignment actions for military personnel required to meet new missions.

(b) United States involvement in Vietnam goes back to the late 1950's with the establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. The first complete combat support units of U.S. forces arrived in December 1961, together with a support team from the 9th Logistical Command on Okinawa. This small team formed the nucleus from which United States Army, Vietnam (USAR) evolved. As the Army units in-country increased, the U.S. Army, Ryukyus Support Group, Provisional, took over logistics control of U.S. units in Vietnam. Further increases in U.S. troops necessitated that the support command be changed to United States Army Support Group, Vietnam, which was redesignated USARV on 20 July 1965. Since the in-country logistics base in Vietnam was not considered adequate to allow expansion as required to support U.S. forces, the deployment of a U.S. Army logistical command to Vietnam was proposed as a solution to this deficiency. The need for an Army Logistical Command was first proposed by the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), as early as 1962. This proposal was disapproved by both the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who, at that time, felt the requirement was not justified. Based upon further developments and restudy of this requirement, CINCPAC proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 November 1964 and again on 13 January 1965, that a Logistical Command be introduced into Vietnam to overcome inadequacies in the logistic support posture of forces. This recommendation was ultimately approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in February 1965. The advance party of the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, arrived in Vietnam during March 1965, and the command was formally established on 1 April 1965 with an authorized headquarters strength of 21 officers and 17 enlisted personnel. By 30 June 1965, the headquarters strength had grown to 217-63 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 152 enlisted personnel<sup>2</sup>—and was controlling a total logistical force of more than 22,000 personnel. The 1st Logistical Command eventually established and maintained support commands and depots throughout Vietnam, which provide logistic support to all in-country U.S. and free world forces. To accomplish this mission, the aggregate military strength of the logistical command had grown to a peak strength in July 1968 of approximately 50,000 military personnel with approximately an equal number of civilian and contract personnel.<sup>3</sup>

(c) There were several factors that tended to complicate personnel planning during the Vietnam buildup. First, the type and detailed organization of units requested for deployment in Vietnam were frequently changed. When organizational changes were requested, the information had to be introduced manually into the requirements data base, which was undergoing continuous change itself (see Chapter III). Secondly, decisions on end strengths, deployments, total force structure composition, and trainees, transients, patients, prisoners, and students (TTPPS) were neither anticipatory nor timely. A third problem was the slow rate at which manpower could be trained and made available using established training resources. This problem was particularly acute in meeting the qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements of those units to be deployed to Vietnam, sustaining deployed units with high-quality replacements, and providing experienced leadership and skilled technicians for expansion of the training base. During early FY 66, a new policy required that unit personnel deploying to Vietnam have a minimum of 60 days (later 90 days) of obligated service remaining on the date of departure from port of embarkation. It was anticipated that the unit would be deployed and arrive in Vietnam at full strength, and be capable of accomplishing its assigned mission during its initial year in-country. Replacements would, however, be obtained on an individual basis rather than through further unit deployment. Individual replacements, who were required to have 6 months or more of obligated service remaining, would arrive with no more than a 7-day overlap. This policy caused considerable turbulence in both sending and receiving activities. Units lost experienced personnel who had participated in basic and advanced unit training, field maneuvers,

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Letter, subject: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 June 1965, 15 July 1965.

<sup>3</sup>Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, Tour 365, 1969, p. 5.



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and exercises in anticipation of the unit's deployment to Vietnam. However, this policy precluded the major personnel movements that would have resulted from large-scale unit rotation.

(d) With the onset of hostilities in Vietnam, the Active Army found itself without plans or the essential accurate data with which to develop plans for expanding its strength without calling up the Reserves (which was not possible without a Presidential declaration of national emergency). Personnel planning necessarily was accorded the highest priority of those elements comprising military strategy. Personnel procurement, individual training, and distribution of personnel assets each contributed. The increase in Army strength from 969,066 in 1965 to 1,442,498 in 1967 was largely accomplished through new accessions.<sup>4</sup> In lieu of Reserve components trained personnel, the Active Army had to rely on first-term enlistments and the Selective Service System as the primary means to expand its military strength and to sustain deployments to both Vietnam and worldwide Army forces. These personnel required basic combat training and advanced individual training or other military occupational specialty (MOS) training before they would become part of the effective operating strength. This meant a minimum 7-month delay from the date required by the Selective Service System to the date available for deployment to Vietnam or elsewhere—from entry-into-service to completion of advanced individual training (about 5 months) plus the 2-month minimum notice required by the Selective Service System. The separation, at the same time, of skilled and experienced personnel was detrimental to the expansion of forces. The Active Army was forced to expand its military strength with recruits and second lieutenants. Thus, force structure requirements actually became a secondary consideration to the capability of the Army to produce newly trained personnel and its ability to redistribute more thinly the available experienced personnel assets.

(e) Army losses from 30 June 1965 through 30 June 1967 are indicative of the constant struggle to maintain an adequacy of quantity and quality. During this period a total of 1,057,900 personnel entered the Army and losses totaled 584,500. The resulting numerical turnover of personnel exceeded the Army's peak strength. Of the total gains, 977,000 were new accessions with no prior military experience (616,600 draftees; 360,400 first-term enlistees). Another 80,900 were procured from other sources such as reenlistees within 90 days of discharge—categories of personnel that could be assigned directly to operating elements of the Army or placed in the Army's school system for brief courses of instruction to adapt their previously acquired skills to military use. The majority of these losses went into the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool (RRMRP) rather than Reserve component units. The losses took highly developed skills and valuable field experience into the Reserve components that would have provided an important source of trained personnel in the event of an emergency (other than Vietnam). However, the monthly personnel loss for the Army averaged over 24,000 trained personnel, whereas its total strength was expanding by almost 50 percent. These losses created turbulence, denied the Army the use of immediately available trained skills, and required that over one million men and women be brought on duty to achieve an increase in overall strength of less than 474,000.<sup>5</sup>

(f) Replacing skilled individuals with personnel of like skills was a serious problem. The Army was faced not only with the problem of training hundreds of thousands of entry-level skills; it had to provide additional training in lieu of skill progression normally acquired by on-the-job experience. To ameliorate this situation, the CONUS Sustaining Increment (CSI) concept was developed and put into operation. It added military positions in certain skills to the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Tables and Distribution (TD), and Tables of Allowance (TA) structures. These added positions were heavy in aviation, engineer construction, marine operations, supply and maintenance, and electronic skills. The concept visualized the assignment of individuals with entry-level skills directly from the training base, when necessary, to these positions for experience and skill progression prior to their assignment to short-tour areas in such numbers to achieve a ratio of 2:1:1 in long and short tours, respectively. The CSI was discontinued in name in mid-1967 but the basic concept, still valid,

<sup>4</sup>Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Strength of the Army, Part II: Strength, Gains and Losses to Active Army (U), 30 June 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL).

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

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is the mainstay behind its successor, the Skill Development Base (SDB). The Army is still experiencing difficulty in meeting short tour replacement requirements with individuals of proper grade and skill. Review of the worldwide status of military skills in March 1969 revealed an increased number of skills for which the ratio of base structure to short-tour structure was not adequate to support the current rotation policy. Thus, overages in these same skills accrued in CONUS as personnel returned from short-tour areas to a base that contained inadequate positions to accommodate their proper military specialty. A major factor contributing to this problem in the combat service support area is that the logistical functions carried out primarily by military personnel overseas are performed largely by civilians in CONUS.

(g) The reorganization of the Army in 1962 reassigned, but fragmented the responsibilities for logistic management. Logistic functional responsibilities formerly assigned the Chiefs of the Technical Services were assumed by various other commands and agencies that were inexperienced in this field. Included were the establishment of logistic doctrine and logistic personnel policies, and the conduct of training functions. Further, a subsequent reorganization that occurred coincidentally with the Vietnam expansion was COSTAR (Combat Support of the Army), a concept which functionalized the logistic support provide to the Field Army. In September 1965, although U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Army, Korea, had converted to the COSTAR configuration, this concept had not been implemented in CONUS and Vietnam. Logistic units in CONUS and Vietnam were subsequently reorganized in mid- and late 1966 to encompass the COSTAR concept. However, logistic units deployed to Vietnam prior to early 1966 remained organized under the technical service concept. Consequently, those units were mission-oriented to accomplish specific ordnance, signal, quartermaster, transportation, engineer, and chemical unit assignments. Continual changes to logistics doctrine and operations impacted severely on the ability of the Army to train and manage the careers of its logistics personnel. Considerable delay developed between the time operations and organizations were functionalized and doctrine defining individual skill level requirements for various skill career stages was published and implemented. Hence, service schools were unable to revise MOS training and career courses in consonance with the reorganization. Thus, the Army continued to train logistic personnel using the obsolescent technical service philosophy while its forces in the field were being organized under the COSTAR functional concept. Unavoidable turbulence was experienced due to the realignment of support missions, transfer of personnel and equipment, and completion of unit training necessary for development of an effective logistic support posture.

### (2) Navy

(a) In general, Navy manpower resources have been adequate to meet the requirements generated by hostilities in SE Asia. Periodically, particularly during the early buildup period, Navy in-country activities experienced short-term quantitative and qualitative personnel shortages. In most instances these shortages developed as a result of unprogrammed requirements requiring short-notice selection, training, and assignment of personnel from limited resources. Periodic shortages resulted not only from piecemeal and unplanned personnel augmentations, but also from the interplay of many policies that had to be accommodated in the selection and assignment of personnel to duty in SE Asia. In similar fashion, delays in approval of personnel requirements were engendered by procedures within the Service that required review of the organizational structure of new activities and billet-by-billet justification of manpower requested. In a peacetime environment these review and approval procedures are considered neither unusual nor unduly time-consuming. Under conditions involving open hostilities they sometimes appeared needlessly detailed and exasperatingly lengthy. Normal procedures required processing and justifying new requirements through the chain of command to an approving authority—the Secretary of Defense, in case of major force requirements packages, or the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in cases involving minor manpower requirements. Following approval of billet structures or augmentation to existing activities, personnel had to be selected and trained, then transported to their duty stations. Policy required a 30-day leave prior to transfer to South Vietnam and counterinsurgency and escape and evasion training. The average time that expired between issuance of orders to a nonrated man and reporting for duty was about 3 months. This increased to about 5 months for top pay grades, and averaged between 4 and 6 months for officers. Emergency requirements were filled sometimes within hours. Occasionally

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much longer delays ensued, particularly when billet justification was considered incomplete. However, once approved and filled, follow-on personnel were provided as contact reliefs.

(b) Delays in initial staffing are illustrated from history. On 17 July 1965 the Secretary of the Navy approved establishment of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA, Da Nang). On 21 July 1965 the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), promulgated the mission and tasks and established a target date of 15 October 1965 for activation. Commander Service Force planned the initial organization, including use of Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFCs). When NSA, Da Nang, was activated on 15 October, on schedule, only 39 percent of the allowance of 170 officers and 3,477 enlisted men had reported.<sup>6</sup> Tasks assigned to NSA, Da Nang, continually required personnel augmentation, generating a requirement for a flag rank commander by January 1966. As requirements outpaced arrival of personnel, new activities often had to be manned initially by spin-offs from existing activities. The first contingent of 5 officers and 20 enlisted men for NSA, Da Nang's detachment at Chu Lai came from the parent activity in April 1965. Not until 1 January 1966 had sufficient new personnel arrived to relieve personnel temporarily assigned to NSA, Da Nang, from the amphibious construction battalion, assault craft division, the beachmaster unit and Mobile Support Unit 3. However, sometimes the flow of personnel to in-country activities outstripped available accommodations. Thus, during December 1967 it became necessary to reduce the personnel inputs to NSA, Da Nang, to keep the on-board count below 8,000. This restriction was lifted in March on completion of additional barracks. The ebb and flow of personnel inputs to South Vietnam Navy activities produced both minor shortages and excesses, as might be expected. For example, on 30 June 1967, NSA, Da Nang, and its detachments had an authorized allowance of 8,359 with 7,854 personnel on board; NSA, Saigon, and its detachments had an allowance of 2,118 with 1,892 on board. By 30 June 1968 Da Nang's allowance was 9,638, with 9,437 on board; Saigon's allowance of 3,132 was topped by an on-board count of 3,239.<sup>7</sup> Countrywide, including construction battalions (CBs) and other logistic support organizations, there was a surprisingly low disparity of only 91 personnel in excess of a grand total authorization of 23,780.

(c) Throughout the Vietnam era there have been significant limitations on the availability of personnel in certain ratings that were required in quantity by in-country activities. These ratings have included bosun's mates, machinist's mates, electronics technicians, and storekeepers. Vietnam requirements were met on a proportional basis with those of the rest of the Naval Establishment. This reflects a decision that to do otherwise would incapacitate Navy activities, including ships, required to fulfill missions and tasks outside of Vietnam.

(d) The extraordinary increase in personnel requirements of the major in-country Navy logistic support activities to over 15,000 officers and men was swift, largely piecemeal, and unpredictable as new, enlarged, and unexpected tasks were assigned on short notice. Thousands of additional men were required to man combat ships, patrol craft, small operational bases, etc., in connection with counterinfiltration patrols, riverine warfare, mine-sweeping, and related operations. The Navy drew from essentially the same resources to man all these new activities. Of the great majority of more than 38,000 officers and men in-country, plus the thousands more required to raise Seventh Fleet manning levels and augment supporting activities, officers came principally from the General Line (code 1100) officers of the Navy and enlisted men from the General Service ratings. These were supplemented by hundreds of specialists, such as civil engineers, medical officers, supply officers, and so forth. Occasional shortages in particular specialties developed in these latter groups when the particular qualification was in low reserve in the Navy's inventory, e.g., POL technicians and transportation experts.

(e) Despite momentary shortages, the transition from supporting sea- to land-based operations was accomplished by thousands of junior officers and enlisted men with

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Pacific Fleet, Report of Operations of Service Force, FY 1966 (U), p. 6-2 (CONFIDENTIAL).

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Pacific Fleet, Report of Operations of Service Force, FYs 1967 and 1968 (U), 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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a minimum of difficulty. Despite growing pains, some inefficiencies due to shortages of specialists, and some delays due to manpower availability and procedural personnel policies, the organization and expansion of major overseas logistical support organizations appear to have been adequate to the tasks. No recorded documentation has been found indicating that mission and task assignments of in-country activities have been unduly jeopardized or inordinately delayed by shortages in quantity or quality of personnel assigned. Apparently, Navy personnel requirements in SE Asia were adequately met.

(f) In-country requirements for personnel severely affected the rest of the Navy. There was no substantial modification or reduction in other mission and task assignments of the Naval Establishment. As will be developed later in this monograph, operational and logistical capabilities of forces and activities that were not protected by the priority assigned to Vietnam activities for personnel suffered severe personnel turbulence, loss of expertise, and a marked degradation of operational readiness in many instances.

### (3) Air Force

(a) Prior to the summer of 1965, when SE Asia operations sharply increased, the USAF manpower pool had been decreasing as a result of previous decisions and actions. Thereafter, the trend was reversed and the Air Force undertook to enlarge its personnel base as rapidly as possible. Because new recruits were usually unskilled, the Air Training Command and many units had to shoulder the heaviest training burden since the Korean War. An unusual amount of strain, confusion, and overwork followed, sometimes causing deterioration in the combat readiness of the units not directly involved in the war.

(b) Training facilities and staffs, geared for peacetime operations, were too small and sparsely equipped to absorb the load. By the end of 1965 the Air Force faced the following manpower shortages: trained fighter and transport pilots; instructors for combat crew and undergraduate pilot training schools; aircraft mechanics; conventional munitions handlers and loaders; radio, radar, and photographic specialists; instructors in technical schools; and high-level supervisors to give on-the-job training to recently graduated technicians and other partially skilled airmen. With SE Asia getting first priority, these shortages spread throughout the Air Force and affected units in the United States and Europe.

(c) Since units in the combat areas had priority for manpower, most state-side units, and to some extent all units not in SE Asia, became little more than service organizations. Although additional skilled personnel to man and support the combat forces was the most urgent requirement, the demands of logistics, airlift, and training caused even greater manpower shortages. Air Force Secretary Brown stated in September 1966 that estimates of the amount of extra work required had been unrealistically low, and he noted that an unexpected upsurge of activity in one command or agency caused personnel shortages and skyrocketing costs in others. In July 1965 the Air Staff prepared plans for a 2-year expansion of technical training to meet wartime demands. Subsequently, the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force reduced this time to 1 year. This compression required recruiting about 127,600 men without previous service—the largest number since FY 55, when 158,180 had been recruited. The induction of 159,180 recruits in FY 66 overloaded the induction and basic military training center at Lackland AFB, Texas, and later almost all of the technical training centers. In spite of the compressed time schedule and overcrowded conditions in training centers, the number of airmen graduating from technical schools increased dramatically—from 116,965 in FY 64 to 157,350 in FY 67.<sup>8</sup> On-the-job training proved a large and difficult task also. Most of the graduates had little more than apprentice-level skills and were far from ready to assume the intricate tasks demanded of them in a combat unit. From 1964 to 1967 a significant portion of USAF technical training was devoted to retraining and upgrade training, primarily on the job. During FY

<sup>8</sup> USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, USAF Manpower in Limited War 1964-1967 (U), November 1968 (TOP SECRET).

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65, 10,370 airmen completed their retraining and 13,870 were being retrained on 30 June.<sup>9</sup> About 113,000 airmen completed upgrade training, and at one time 121,000 were increasing their skills. On-the-job training placed an almost intolerable burden on commands whose primary commitments lay elsewhere. After the initial surge requirements had been accommodated, the technical training base gradually returned to a nearly normal operation during 1966; and by the end of 1966, most critical demands of the combat theater had been met. However, in 1967 the Air Force still found it necessary occasionally to set up special technical courses to meet new needs in SE Asia, such as explosive ordnance disposal.

(d) As of 31 August the quantity of the logistics enlisted workforce (97 percent overall manning) was adequate. As of 30 June 1969 the quantity (approximately 100 percent overall manning) of the officer force was also sufficient. The Air Force accomplished its mission in SE Asia; however, skill and experience levels were less than optimum, especially in the intermediate (major and lieutenant colonel) levels of supervisory officer personnel.

(e) In retrospect, the Air Force underwent an initial period of stress and turbulence in meeting its skilled and experienced personnel needs and training requirements to support SE Asia. Adjustments were made over a 2-year period, and by 1967 the personnel situation returned to normal. Tight management controls were retained and personnel resources were budgeted to ensure a continuing ability to meet personnel commitments in SE Asia. Securing skilled and experienced manpower resources for assignment to first tours in SE Asia remains an area of concern and constant attention, particularly in the aircraft maintenance, weapons, and munitions specialist areas. However, the situation has improved considerably.

### (4) Marine Corps

(a) Manpower programming action has been responsive to Marine Corps personnel needs. On 12 October 1967 the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps informed the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture that manpower resources should be adequate to sustain Marine Corps commitments through 1968 and that problems in the areas of manpower and logistics had been solved.<sup>10</sup> He also stated that uncommitted forces were generally marginally combat ready.

(b) Marine Corps forces are structured to provide a rapid assault for relatively short-duration operations. Marine Corps Tables of Organization (T/O) were not designed for protracted land campaigns, including the myriad of auxiliary functions assigned to Marines in South Vietnam. Compounding the T/O problem is the continuing level of non-effectives associated with it. Additionally, Marine Corps T/Os were not designed to support the conduct of multiple base-defense operations while multiple full-scale offensive operations are being conducted at widely separated locations.

(c) The nature and extended duration of the conflict in Vietnam generated tasks with requirements for personnel over and above those reflected in T/Os. The following tasks required additional personnel.

1. Operation of clubs
2. Management of PXs
3. Administration of rest and recuperation (R&R) programs

<sup>9</sup>Headquarters United States Air Force, Directorate of Personnel Training and Education, History, July-December 1965 (U), pp. 156-160 (CONFIDENTIAL).

<sup>10</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Point Paper, AC1C-CB-13, Marine Corps Personnel Situation, (U), 1968 (SECRET).

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4. Security and maintenance of camps and bases
5. Administration of rotation program
6. Provision of helicopter door gunners
7. Provision of recreational facilities
8. Provision of additional laundry facilities

(d) Since these tasks had to be accomplished within approved manpower ceilings, it was necessary to:

1. Draw down on soft skills (i.e., infantry) to fill critical base support and logistic support augment billets.

2. Use hard skills to perform both hard-skill technical and soft-skill tasks, such as using aviation ordnance technicians and mechanics to perform helicopter door gunner and airfield security functions. This policy resulted in diminished efficiency, particularly in logistic support and aviation support fields.

(e) The Force Logistic Command Chronology of December 1966 indicated additional factors that reduced the availability of personnel.<sup>11</sup> These included R&R leave that averaged 120 men daily; 30-day special leave, averaging 162 men monthly; and perimeter guard and security, a continually increasing requirement since combat areas expanded and required that forces be fragmented into detachments.

(f) In September 1967, 19,293 additional manpower requirements were identified to support SE Asia operations. They were not requested for FY 68 because of budgeting restrictions. As a result of projected reduced force readiness, the Secretary of Defense approved an increase of 7,000 additional Marines for FY 68. These individuals were for training and to sustain deployments within the constraints of personnel rotation policies. This approval was adequate to meet sustaining base requirements.

### b. Retention

#### (1) Army

(a) Insufficient retention of junior officers on active duty since the end of the Korean War has resulted in a shortage of officers with from 3 to 13 years of service. In FY 69 the Army was short about 5,000 majors and 15,000 captains; at the same time, some 15,000 lieutenants were in excess of authorized allowances. Expanded input of lieutenants through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs has partially offset the shortage of captains and majors. However, because of the large influx of lieutenants, some 50 percent of the officers in an active duty status have less than 2 years of service. Hence, a low experience level has resulted. In FY 69, 87 percent of ROTC and 64 percent of OCS officers left the Service after completing their 2 years of obligated service. If this trend continues, the already undesirable shortage of mid-level experienced officers will increase. This shortage forced the Army to look toward more rapid promotions to meet grade requirements, which meant that the experience level for the grade was lower than desirable. Not only has this situation created an unbalanced experience distribution, but this experience gap has had a deleterious effect on mission accomplishment and has required more frequent tours in Vietnam for captains and majors. Although the recent retention experience of the Army has shown a general upward trend, it has not kept pace with requirements. Moreover, some branches have larger requirements than others. Logistical branch retention rates for other

<sup>11</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, History, Force Logistic Command Chronology (U), December 1966, (U), Tab 5, Enclosure 2 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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than Regular Army (OTRA) obligated tour officers are shown in Table 6. The retention rate is the percent extending on active duty, out of those eligible. The number eligible are those who will complete their obligated tour of service during the indicated fiscal year.

TABLE 6  
RETENTION RATES FOR OBLIGATED TOUR LOGISTICAL OFFICERS  
(OTHER THAN REGULAR ARMY)

Fiscal Year	Ordnance Corps	Quartermaster Corps	Transportation Corps	Chemical Corps	Corps of Engineers	Signal Corps
1965	30.5	19.6	21.6	23.3	14.2	21.6
1966	34.2	17.3	19.3	15.2	15.9	21.8
1967	34.1	10.8	13.7	10.3	8.5	20.9
1968	27.5	14.6	19.1	12.9	9.3	32.1
1969	37.7	21.8	28.9	17.9	19.8	31.4

Source: Department of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Letter, subject: Commander's Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers, 16 October 1969.

(b) Retaining enlisted men in junior grades also presented problems. Career soldiers, individuals with more than 3 years of service, numbered nearly 400,000 in 1965; by 1969, with over half a million more men in the Army, the career force had been reduced to less than 300,000. The career Regular Army reenlistment rate declined approximately 20 percent, from 84.1 percent in FY 65 to 64.5 percent in FY 69. The reenlistment rate for those serving their first term decreased approximately 8 percent during this period (25.7 percent in FY 65; 17.4 percent in FY 69).<sup>12</sup>

### (2) Navy

(a) Year after year, CNO's Annual Posture Statement emphasized the Navy's concern with declining retention rates. In FY 65 he said:

"We are seriously concerned over retention rates in many other categories, especially those of our most critical ratings."<sup>13</sup>

And in 1968:

"... retention still remains our major problem. About 80 percent of our young enlisted men are returning to civilian life upon completion of their first enlistment. The Variable Reenlistment Bonus and other inducements have helped but we still retain fewer than we need. Officer retention is also low; for example, during the past year fewer than 40 percent of our Reserve aviators remained on active duty beyond their obligated service. . . . the experience level, especially in unrestricted line officers and non-commissioned petty officers is significantly below our real needs."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1969, Final Draft.

<sup>13</sup>Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, Annual Posture Statement, FY 1965.

<sup>14</sup>Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, Annual Posture Statement, FY 1968.



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(b) Table 7 depicts the percent of naval officer losses from FY 61 to FY 66 at the end of obligated service for officers entering the Service from various sources.

(c) The loss of first-term enlistees and career petty officers was fully as critical as that of junior officers. The trend declined steadily. The monthly average number of first-term reenlistments for FY 1967 was 1,275, dropping to 1,057 for FY 68 and to 1,042 for FY 69. Statistics in the Navy reenlistments rates for FY 65 - FY 69 are indicated in Table 8.

TABLE 7  
NAVAL OFFICER LOSS RATE, FY 61 - FY 66

Source	Years Obligated	Date of Rank	Number Commissioned	Fiscal Year Losses (Percent)					
				1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
U. S. Naval Academy	3	FY 57	568	4.8	12.6	19.2	22.7	25.5	26.6
	4	FY 58	625			17.8	23.7	26.7	28.2
	4	FY 59	637				21.5	28.1	28.7
	4	FY 60	648					19.3	23.1
	4	FY 61	664						13.9
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (Regular)	3	FY 57	1,064	70.1	75.0	79.2	80.9	82.2	83.2
	3	FY 58	1,132		65.5	71.5	76.2	78.0	78.5
	3	FY 59	970			63.2	71.4	76.3	76.6
	3	FY 60	1,012				57.0	70.0	73.6
	4	FY 61	894						59.7
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (Contract)	2	FY 58	951	71.2	88.5	91.9	92.6	92.6	94.4
	2	FY 59	837		82.1	87.4	90.3	92.2	93.3
	2	FY 60	949			80.8	86.4	89.2	90.8
	2	FY 61	815				78.2	84.3	87.7
	2	FY 62	644					75.0	80.7
Officer Candidate School	3	Fy 57	3,725	81.5	84.5	85.7	86.6	86.8	87.2
	3	FY 58	2,008		79.3	82.7	84.2	84.6	85.1
	3	FY 59	2,235			68.5	75.4	76.6	77.4
	3	FY 60	2,441				71.8	76.0	76.9
	3	FY 61	2,141					67.4	74.6
	3	FY 62	3,522						74.7
Reserve Officer Candidate	3	FY 57	214	67.8	74.3	75.2	77.6	78.5	78.5
	3	FY 58	200		56.0	69.0	73.0	75.0	77.0
	3	FY 59	206			78.2	84.0	85.4	86.4
	3	FY 60	188				65.4	72.4	74.5
	3	FY 61	147					59.9	68.0
	3	FY 62	129						60.5

Source: Department of the Navy, Manpower Planning and Control Division. NAVPERS Report 15658, Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Statistics, 31 December 1969.



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TABLE 8  
NAVY REENLISTMENT RATES

Category of Service	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69
a. First Term	21.4 (21.8)	23.7 (20.7)	18.9 (22.1)	16.8 (18.4)	16.3 (n. a.)
b. Second Term	81.2	81.7	68.3	65.8	64.5
c. Other Term	98.6	98.1	95.6	95.7	95.2
d. Career (b&c)	86.7 (87.5)	89.6 (82.7)	80.9 (86.9)	79.4 (79.7)	78.4 (n. a.)
e. Overall (a&b)	39.1 (40.4)	44.0 (38.7)	37.9 (43.3)	35.7 (36.9)	34.2 (n. a.)

Rates in parentheses are adjusted to

Exclude eligibles who were:

- separated earlier than their Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) for immediate reenlistment
- separated earlier than ETS for strength control purposes
- extended beyond ETS under involuntary extension

Include eligibles who were:

- early separatees whose ETS was in the current month (year)
- early separatees, for strength control purposes, whose ETS was in the current month (year)

Source: Department of the Navy, Manpower Planning and Control Division, E195 Data compilation from NAVPERS Report 15658, Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Statistics.

A first-term reenlistment rate of 30 to 40 percent would be required to remedy the existing deficit. Once corrected, a rate of 20 to 27 percent would be required to maintain the desired force levels. The high loss rates in officer and enlisted personnel indicate that the Navy is not maintaining itself on a career basis either in terms of quantity or quality. This situation existed throughout the Vietnam era.

(d) A wide variety of reasons exists for low retention rates, all of them aggravated by the Vietnam conflict. The most widely understood is the requirement for sea duty. A naval career is characterized by repetitive assignments to long periods at sea. Conditions of service associated with this duty include work weeks of 72 hours or longer, austere living and working conditions, limited recreational facilities, and emotional stresses imposed by a confining environment. Extended periods of family separation are increasingly unacceptable to junior officers and enlisted men. The Navy's problem in retaining high-quality young officers and enlisted men is further aggravated by the economic attractiveness of civilian life, as well as by the general climate of antiwar sentiment that exists in parts of the civilian community. The attractions of higher salaries, higher education, and more socially acceptable and prestigious employment weigh heavily in considerations of top-caliber personnel.

### (3) Air Force

(a) Officer retention rates in the logistics area are low. This reflects the nature of the input, which consists substantially of noncareer-oriented individuals. The retention rate is one factor leading to a serious imbalance in rank. Officers at the 0-1 and 0-2 levels with little experience must be used in more senior assignments. In spite of the shortage of officers experienced in the logistics functions, officers at levels above 0-3 are forced to retire

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by administrative regulations and laws governing military retirement. An unknown number of losses are attributed to the absence of visible logistics careers and the failure of defined careers to actualize. Within the Air Force, the logistics area, as well as all other support areas, is deeply affected by the shortage of rated officers in the combat force. Since 1960, rated officer losses have exceeded rated production. This deficit in the production of rated officers is made up through withdrawal of rated officers from the support specialties. Since 1960, approximately 14,200 rated officers have been either withdrawn from support areas to satisfy the demands of the combat force for rated personnel or lost to the inventory through separation or retirement. The number of rated officers in the support areas has decreased from about 19,000 to approximately 4,800 as of November 1969. Large numbers of those withdrawn or lost from the logistics personnel inventory were experienced field-grade officers. The large requirement of rated skills and knowledge (approximately 31,000 cockpit positions and 36,700 positions requiring rated expertise) brought about by the conflict in SE Asia has limited the return of many of these experienced officers to the logistics area upon completion of a tour of duty in SE Asia; i. e., they are applied against a priority rated requirement in the continental United States (CONUS). A few experienced logistics officers were returned from rated duties to the logistics area; however, the return was less than the withdrawal. This net deficit, when added to the losses incurred through separations and retirements, accounted for the severe drawdown sustained by the support areas.

(b) The Air Force airmen force structure is predicated upon a career force of 340,000 enlisted personnel. To maintain this desired structure requires an annual input to the career force of approximately 29,000 personnel, or about 25 percent of all first-term eligibles. To date the Air Force has been unable to retain sufficient numbers of first-term enlistees to maintain the desired enlisted career force. The retention of USAF first-term airmen and of USAF first-term airmen in selected logistics specialties are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively.

(4) Marine Corps. Although manpower ceilings have been adequate to support Marine Corps programs, retention of qualified skilled junior officers and enlisted personnel has been a matter of concern.

TABLE 9

### AIR FORCE RETENTION OF FIRST-TERM AIRMEN

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Eligibles</u>	<u>Reenlistments</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1965	72,000	18,500	25.5
1966	71,690	13,549	18.9
1967	66,406	11,144	16.6
1968	59,019	10,653	18.0
1969	101,264	15,395	15.2

Source: Telecon with Assistant for Career Motivation, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas, 31 August 1969.

<sup>15</sup> Col. F. B. Walters, Chief Assignment Control and Policy Branch, Military Personnel Center, Interview conducted 5 February 1970 at Randolph AFB, Texas.

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TABLE 10  
AIR FORCE RETENTION OF FIRST-TERM AIRMEN  
IN SELECTED LOGISTICS SPECIALTIES

<u>Logistic Specialty</u>	<u>Eligibles</u>	<u>Reenlistments</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Communications-Electronics Systems	11,451	2,470	21.6
Avionics Systems	2,191	455	20.8
Wire Communications Maintenance	1,654	252	15.2
Intricate Systems Maintenance	598	106	17.7
Aircraft Accessory Maintenance	4,756	537	11.3
Aircraft Maintenance	14,274	2,291	16.1
Transportation	4,885	435	8.9
Supply Services	531	79	14.9
Fuel Services	1,667	187	11.2
Supply	6,604	849	12.9
Procurement	198	25	12.6
Precision Measurement Laboratory Specialist	134	3	2.0

Source: Telecon with Airmen Management Division, Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas, 31 August 1969.

(a) The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1969: "Current campus unrest, recent press releases concerning possible revocation of draft legislation and the unpopularity of the war in Southeast Asia all contribute to an unfavorable officer candidate recruiting climate which is making officer procurement increasingly more difficult." In addition, the Marine Corps has been retaining only 35 percent of the junior officers completing obligated military service, as compared to an ideal selective retention goal of 45 percent. Illustrated in Table 11 is the Marine Corps officer retention rate from 1966 through 1969 by principal source.

(b) Of special concern is the retention of enlisted Marines, especially those with skills requiring long-lead-time training reenlistment rates fell from 33.9 percent in FY 66 to 22 percent in FY 67. The rate rose slightly to 23 percent in FY 68, but certain factors continue to militate against an early return to previous Vietnam higher reenlistment rates. These factors are the war, with the likelihood of repeated unaccompanied tours in the combat zone; competition from an expanding economy; programs designed to provide in-service training in civilian skills; and opportunities for early release and employment of those personnel contemplating separation from the Service. The declining retention rate is indicated by the Marine Corps reenlistment statistics given in Table 12.

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TABLE 11  
MARINE CORPS OFFICER RETENTION RATES (PERCENT)

<u>Regular</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>
U. S. Naval Academy	81	76	61	63
U. S. Military Academy	75	100	57	66
U. S. Air Force Academy	100	100	38	100
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps	49	30	42	51
Platoon Leaders Class	<u>88</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>59</u>
Total	79	52	49	57
<u>Reserve</u>				
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps	18	5	51	30
Platoon Leaders Class	42	42	32	30
Officer Candidate Course	30	20	19	28
Aviation Officer Candidate	48	34	25	48
Enlisted Commissioning Program	<u>82</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>89</u>
Total	46	32	29	33
Overall Average	63	35	35	36

Source: U. S. Marine Corps Posture Brochure (S) to accompany statement of General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC, before the House Armed Services Committee.

TABLE 12  
MARINE CORPS REENLISTMENT RATES (PERCENT)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>First Term</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Overall</u>
1960	11.1	67.4	20.3
1961	18.3	78.7	36.3
1962	20.0	83.1	41.8
1963	15.5	84.6	35.4
1964	14.4	85.7	32.9
1965	16.3	84.5	32.9
1966	16.3	88.6	33.9
1967	10.6	77.9	22.0
1968	11.9	76.0	23.0
1969	7.4	74.5	14.3

Source: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Reference Notebook Item, II-D-1/AOIC-ev-hjm, 8 October 1969.

### 3. POLICIES AND DECISIONS AFFECTING MANPOWER RESOURCES

#### a. Decision Not to Call Up Reserve Forces

##### (1) General

(a) On 28 July 1965, President Johnson announced that U.S. forces in South Vietnam would be immediately increased to 125,000 men by resorting to increased draft calls and voluntary enlistments.<sup>16</sup> He further stated that it would be unnecessary to call up Reserves. The following month the Secretary of Defense amplified the President's announcement by stating that the administration planned to meet Vietnam requirements and increase the size of the military forces without mobilizing the Reserves and with only limited service extension in the Navy.

(b) In 1965, two methods for providing Reserve personnel to the Armed Forces were available to the President: he could ask Congress for a joint resolution authorizing the recall of specified units or individuals of the Ready and Standby Reserves, or he could declare a national emergency and call up to one million Ready Reservists for one year. In October 1966, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 67 granted the President an additional option for providing manpower by authorizing him to call any Reserve unit to active duty for up to 24 months. This authority was effective until 30 June 1968. During 1968, under the impact of the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the PUEBLO incident in Korea, this option was exercised. On 11 April 1968, the Secretary of Defense announced the call up of approximately 24,500 personnel from the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force for a period not to exceed 24 months.

(c) Coincident with the decision that Reserve units would not be used for the initial force buildup was the decision that selected elements of the Reserves would be brought up to and maintained at high states of readiness in order to provide a readily available backup capability for dealing with other crises or future needs in SE Asia. The most cogent argument in favor of mobilizing some or all of the Reserve forces was that it would allow the United States to build up its forces in Vietnam much more rapidly than was to be the case.

##### (2) Army

(a) The Reserve component was imbalanced in both numbers and types of combat and support forces required to meet anticipated contingency requirements in the event of mobilization. An effort was made in FY 65 to realign the Reserve component structure to meet requirements of contingency plans by streamlining the administrative structure, retaining only needed units, and increasing their readiness for early deployment. At the same time participation for all Reservists in drill-pay status was preserved. During the December 1967-May 1968 period, further reorganization resulted in retaining only units manned at more than 90 percent of full wartime strength.

(b) Until 1965 Army plans included provision for mobilization of Reserve training divisions to free most of the Active Army training center cadre for reassignment. One Reserve training division is capable of training 50,000 recruits per year. During the Vietnam buildup Army training divisions were not mobilized. Consequently, the Active Army training center cadre could not be relieved, but had to be expanded in order to cope with the mounting influx of recruits. Active divisions normally held as part of the Strategic Reserve were assigned the additional mission of training recruits, to the detriment of their combat readiness.

(c) Prior to 1965 Army planning anticipated that support units, for a conflict of the dimensions ultimately reached in SE Asia, would be drawn from the Reserve. In 1965,

<sup>16</sup>President Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1965, Volume 22, pp. 794-799.

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"the Reserve Forces Troop Basis contained most of the service support type units for a secondary theater in an underdeveloped area . . . With the decision that the active Army would fight the war in Vietnam, it devolved upon us to fill this requirement from the ranks of STRAF (Strategic Army Forces) and an accelerated output from the training base."<sup>17</sup> This unexpected demand made the Active Army Strategic Reserve considerably less ready to deploy to Vietnam or elsewhere.

(d) In 1965, the Reserve components had 23 terminal service companies and 19 engineer construction battalions, units that were needed and could have been used in Vietnam to create and operate base facilities. One method of meeting this requirement would have been to call up several Reserve training divisions and enough combat service support units to support the logistical buildup in Vietnam. This method would have permitted the Active Army Strategic Reserve to retain its readiness for deployment to meet other possible contingencies.

(e) The mission of the Individual Ready Reserve is to furnish individual replacement personnel to the Active Forces. During the Vietnam buildup, recall of individuals with critical specialties and junior officers would have eased the pressure on the Active Army in shortage situations. For example, on 30 June 1965 there were 695,263 Reserve Army personnel in a paid status (drill and active duty training).<sup>18</sup>

(f) After the seizure of the USS PUEBLO and the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, more men and trained units were needed. On 31 March 1968, the President announced a limited mobilization of the Reserve components. On 11 April 1968, 34 Army National Guard units and 45 Army Reserve units were alerted for order to active duty on 13 May as a means to quickly strengthen and improve the Army's readiness posture. This mobilization, although limited, served its purpose well. Essential units were provided to meet requirements in Vietnam and in STRAF significantly earlier than would have been possible had Active Army units been formed, trained, and equipped.

### (3) Navy

(a) With the exception of 10 Navy mobile construction battalions (NMCBs) in the Active Forces in January 1965, there were no organized Navy units that could be deployed as such to meet in-country requirements for logistical support personnel. Normally, the Navy does not organize forces into logistical and combat units in the manner of the Army and Marine Corps. Plans for ABFCs include trained cadres of personnel. None of these were in being at the time of the Vietnam buildup. Assignment to the Navy of extensive in-country logistical support missions required creation of two totally new, functionally aligned organizations, each with a number of detachments. The personnel requirements of NSA, Saigon, and NSA, Da Nang, were met through assignment of individual officer and enlisted personnel into billets within those organizations. Specific billet requirements had to be identified, justified, approved, and incorporated into a manning document.

(b) NSA, Da Nang, was assigned the principal logistical mission in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and eventually provided some or all logistical services to Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel. At its peak, over 10,000 Navy personnel provided logistical support services for more than 205,000 U.S. military, Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel, and uncounted civilians.

(c) In the II, III, and IV CTZs the Army's 1st Logistical Command discharged the major support function; however, NSA, Saigon, and its nine detachments provided the majority of the logistical services required by MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN Forces for repair of small craft, communications, billeting, supply, fiscal, and transportation.

<sup>17</sup> U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Testimony of the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, 1966, p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1965, 1967, p. 406.

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(d) Construction requirements in SE Asia established a major requirement for NMCBs. In January 1965 there were 10 NMCBs and 2 amphibious CBs in the Active Forces. These battalions were considered under strength at the commencement of the SE Asia buildup. Because of the decision on mobilization, 975 officers and 9,369 enlisted men in Reserve CBs were not available. The worldwide CB community grew from about 9,400 officers and men in the spring of 1965 to a maximum strength of over 23,000 officers and enlisted men in July 1969. The total number of organized NMCBs on active duty increased from 10 to 21. Except for two Reserve battalions recalled to active duty in order to increase the SE Asia rotation base, the new units had to be recruited and trained.

(e) Logistic ships operating with peacetime personnel allowances were available in the Active Forces to augment Commander, Service Force, Pacific (COMSERVPAC), units providing mobile support to the Seventh Fleet. Additional ammunition ships, oilers, and other support ships were deployed permanently or on rotational basis from the Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) to WESTPAC.

(f) The mission of the Naval Reserve is to provide and maintain trained, ready, and available Reserve units and personnel for employment in the Active Forces as may be directed by CNO. At any given time, approximately 12 percent of the personnel on active duty in the Navy are Reserve officers and enlisted men. Inactive Reserve personnel are organized into a number of programs and components within these programs, all designed to meet mobilization requirements. As of 30 November 1964, some 28,591 officers, 3,541 officer candidates and 52,257 enlisted personnel were on duty with the Active Forces. Approximately 39,456 officers and 108,682 enlisted personnel were available for recall from a drill pay status. Another 157,066 personnel were in the Active Status Pool, with recent active duty experience. There were 10,343 officers and men in Reserve CBs. Totals available in the Inactive Reserve far exceeded the maximum requirement of the Active Naval Forces for augmentation during the Vietnam era. Had the Inactive Reserve been made available, drawdowns on other resources, institution of special procurement programs, and the resultant adverse impact upon the fleets could have been avoided.

(g) Under authority granted as a result of the PUEBLO incident, six air squadrons were recalled to active duty on 27 January 68 and released in October 1968. Although none of these squadrons saw duty in SE Asia, they augmented forces in CONUS that had been depleted by requirements for SE Asia. As has been previously mentioned, two Reserve NMCBs were recalled to active duty and deployed to South Vietnam. NMCB 12 was recalled to active duty on 13 May 1968 and remained on duty until 14 May 1969. NMCB 22 was recalled on 13 May 1968 and released on 28 March 1969. A total of 995 officers and men were included in these two units.

### (4) Air Force

(a) The posture of the USAF Reserve forces at the beginning of the buildup in SE Asia (as of 1 January 1965) is described as follows:

1. Air Force Reserve Personnel. The Air Force Reserve (AFRes) assigned paid strength, less those serving on active duty, consisted of 17,330 officers and 41,680 enlisted personnel.

2. Air Force Reserve Organization. The AFRes was organized into troop carrier, air rescue, aeromedical, medical service, USAF hospital, air terminal, mobile communications, air postal, censorship, and recovery unit organizations.

3. Air Force Reserve Units. Air Force Reserve troop carrier and Air Reserve organizations were comprised of the following:

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<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Wings</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Squadrons</u>
C-119	13	37	-
C-123	1	3	-
C-124	1	5	-
Air Rescue	-	-	5

Source: Joint Logistics Review Board, Working Paper, Logistics Posture, Start of the Conflict, 1 January 1965, 19 December 1969.

4. Air National Guard Personnel. The Air National Guard (ANG) personnel strength of approximately 74,000 was comprised of approximately 10,000 officers and 64,000 airmen.

5. Air National Guard Organization. On 31 December 1964, ANG had 730 federally recognized units. Flying units were organized into 24 wings, 90 groups, and 92 mission squadrons. Nonflying units numbered 106.

6. Air National Guard Units. Tactical units were comprised of the following:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Wings</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Squadrons</u>
Tactical Fighter	7	23	23
Tactical Reconnaissance	3	12	12
Air Refueling	2*	5	5
Air Commands	-	4	4

\*1 Wing and 1 Group completed conversion in February 1965.

Source: Joint Logistics Review Board, Working Paper, Logistics Posture, Start of the Conflict, 1 January 1965, 19 December 1969.

(b) In July 1966 the AFRes activated six military airlift support squadrons to assist the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in aircraft maintenance and in traffic, command post, and forward supply management at enroute stations—McChord AFB, Washington; Travis AFB, California; McGuire AFB, New Jersey; and Charleston AFB, South Carolina. To help the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) prepare for extended limited wars, the Air Force in July also established seven maintenance and seven supply squadrons at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; Kelly AFB, Texas; McClellan AFB, California; Hill AFB, Utah; Robins AFB, Georgia; and Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. At the end of June 1967 these 20 units were manned at 57 to 59 percent of authorization, and achieved 71 percent by June 1968 and 90 percent of authorization the following year.

(c) While on active duty for training purposes, the Reserves provided increased support of the Active Forces during the Vietnam War. In 1966 they carried about 9.4 percent of MAC cargo, flying to Alaska, SE Asia, Japan, South America, and Europe. In air defense, the ANG assumed about 26 percent of the Air Defense Command's (ADC) runway alert duty and also performed radar surveillance and control. The aeromedical evacuation ANG units airlifted patients within the United States and nearby offshore areas and carried 6,375 patients and 5,720 other passengers during 1966 alone. AFRes medical units assisted casualty staging units at Travis AFB, California, and Andrews AFB, Maryland. Working under AFLC, 17 ANG squadrons did much of the communications installation and maintenance, including work on vital parts of the NATO network. In May 1967 five ANG refueling groups went to Europe to augment



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United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) through 1969. During 15-day active duty tours at Travis and Norton AFBs, California; Hickam AFB, Hawaii; and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, 12 AFRes air terminal squadrons provided valuable assistance to MAC.

### (5) Marine Corps

(a) The Marine Corps Reserve is organized to provide a trained force of qualified individuals and units to meet requirements for the initial expansion of the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency.

(b) Prior to 1962 the Marine Corps Reserve was considered strictly a manpower pool for expansion of Regular forces. The reorganization of 1962 formed the major elements of a 4th Division/Wing Team. In 1967 the structure was further tailored to complete the 4th Marine Division. During May 1967 the 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW) reorganized to parallel the composition of a regular wing. On 1 June 1968 the 4th Force Service Regiment and other combat service support units were formed.

(c) At the start of the Vietnam buildup in 1965, the strength of the Marine Corps Reserve was 45,500. The number of personnel that could have been made available at mobilization would have depended on authorized personnel policies. In early 1966, the Marine Corps could have provided a fully manned 4th Division Wing Team, assuming that the delay and exemption criteria established at the time of mobilization had not excluded the 10 percent planned by the Marine Corps and that authority had been granted for recall of prior service Class II Reservists. Subject to certain materiel deficiencies, activated units of this 4th Division/Wing Team would have been capable of performing their mission had they been mobilized.

(d) The logistic support organization of Marine WESTPAC forces prior to deployment of units into South Vietnam consisted of the 3d Marine Division, and 3d Force Service Regiment, both located on Okinawa, and the Marine Wing Service Group (MWSG) of the 1st MAW located in Japan. All three logistic units were operating at reduced strength manning levels. These shortages were further aggravated by turbulence of 13-month unaccompanied tours, lack of continuity in key billets, and transfer of personnel as logistic support units were formed to accompany combat units into Vietnam.

### b. DOD/Service Manpower Management Policies

(1) One-Year Vietnam Tours. DOD Directive 1315.7 established the overseas duty tour lengths for military personnel by area. During the Vietnam era, an unaccompanied 1-year tour was specified for personnel of all Services assigned to South Vietnam and contiguous waters. The exception was USMC personnel, for whom a tour of 13 months was prescribed. To help reduce the personnel turbulence and retain qualified personnel, all Services offered a special 30-day leave to personnel who would extend Vietnam tours for 6 months or more. For the period 2 November 1966 through 15 December 1966, 4,318 servicemen of all Services had taken advantage of the extension option. (It was not until 1970, however, that a loophole in this incentive was discovered: anyone whose release from active duty would occur prior to the full 12-month tour could extend for 6 months, get the 30-day leave, and not remain in Vietnam the desired 18 months.) Another incentive was the second R&R leave given for extensions of from 3 to 6 months. A third was short-term extension to create eligibility for separation under the 90-day (later 150-day) early release program.

### (a) Army

1. In late 1965, to avoid 100 percent rotation of men in a unit in Vietnam at the end of their 12-month tour, the Army applied personnel management techniques to ensure that not more than 25 percent of a unit would be rotated in any one month. These techniques included tour curtailments, short extensions, exchanges of troops within other similar units, and voluntary extensions of individuals.

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2. The rapid buildup, coupled with the 12-month tour of duty, made the replacement program a problem of great magnitude. The regular replacement of personnel on the short-tour basis came close to representing a complete annual turnover. Rotation after a year boosted individual morale, but it also weakened units that had to send their experienced men home. Further, personnel turnover often invalidated training previously accomplished by a unit.

3. Sustaining Army deployments in Vietnam has been one of the major concerns over the period of the Army expansion and the Vietnam buildup. Of the approximate 1.5 million men and women in the Army, some 700,000 are serving overseas at one time. Of the more than 800,000 serving in the United States, over 170,000 are trainees not ready for assignment.<sup>19</sup>

4. A large portion of the Army's enlisted requirements are in skills that are not self-sustaining because the requirements for them in long-tour areas are inadequate to provide a rotation base for short-tour areas. The effect of an inadequate rotation base has been to create a high level of personnel movement and turbulence throughout the sustaining base units of the Army. This movement has led to reduced readiness in the forces outside Vietnam and compromise to some degree the 25-month base tour objective. It has meant that 2,600 personnel were returned involuntarily to short-tour areas in FY 68 and 7,000 in FY 69, before completing their base tours.<sup>20</sup>

### (b) Navy

1. Although morale was increased by the 1-year tour policy, the effect of this policy upon the personnel assets of the Navy was to increase the already high state of personnel turbulence. By mid-1969, with well over 30,000 enlisted men in-country, this policy resulted in the rotation of about 2,500 enlisted personnel per month to and from duty in Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters. Because of the priority given to manning South Vietnam billets, the rapid turnover of personnel required almost continuous drawdowns on the rest of the Navy to provide high-quality enlisted personnel and substantial numbers of officers in the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant junior grade. Collateral policies required billets assigned to South Vietnam activities to be billed at 100 percent of allowance quantitatively, and insofar as possible, qualitatively. Contact relief was required in all cases, until late in 1969 when the Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) provided the Bureau of Naval Personnel with a list of billets in the lowest paygrades that could be left vacant for up to 1 month. Since up to a 3-month manpower overlap for an incumbent and his replacement was generally allocated, the 1-year tour policy required an upsurge in training and increased the number of personnel in the pipeline.

2. Basic policy also provided that a Vietnam veteran could not be involuntarily reassigned to a second tour for 3 years without specific approval of the Chief of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS). This policy and a preferential duty reassignment policy both operated to steadily reduce the pool of personnel available for assignment to Vietnam.

### (c) Air Force

1. In accordance with DOD Directive 1315.7, the Air Force has maintained a 1-year tour of duty for SE Asia, with the exception that, prior to 1 July 1968, rated officers flying missions over North Vietnam could have tours curtailed in recognition of risk. "Southeast Asia tour policy is that Air Force members will not be required to serve a

<sup>19</sup>U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Appropriations for 1970, Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part 7, 1969, p. 122.

<sup>20</sup>Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1969, Final Draft, p. 61.

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second PCS (permanent change of station) tour in Southeast Asia until other similarly qualified members have served a tour.<sup>21</sup> With a standard 12-month tour in SE Asia, replacements for this short-cycle assignment had to be closely and constantly planned. The Air Force had to ensure that those who had not yet served a SE Asia tour were available to serve when they were needed. Accordingly, the following were some of the more important policies that ensured availability:

- a. Establishment of a SE Asia-critical specialty code list to conserve SE Asia-eligible resources
- b. Discontinuance of tour extension for SE Asia-eligibles serving overseas on long tours
- c. Voluntary and involuntary consecutive overseas tours
- d. Reduction of time-on-station and time-in-CONUS from 18 to 12 months for overseas movement.
- e. Secretarial waivers to permit more than one movement within the same fiscal year, where necessary (on a case-by-case basis)
- f. Restriction of officers possessing SE Asia-critical skills from assignment to long overseas tours
- g. Grade substitutions, where possible
- h. Authority to withdraw materiel personnel from stabilized positions prior to tour completion dates.

2. These policies permitted the Air Force to consistently meet its logistics officer commitments in SE Asia without resorting to either second involuntary SE Asia tours or major changes in personnel utilization. The 1-year tour policies in SE Asia primarily affected the area of personnel management and utilization.

### (d) Marine Corps

1. Initially, the normal tour of duty for all Marines assigned to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), whether serving in Vietnam or elsewhere in WESTPAC, was 13 months. The tour length was reduced to 12 months to coincide with DOD Directive 1315.7. Marine Corps policy requires every Marine returning from an unaccompanied tour in WESTPAC to serve at least 24 months prior to reassignment to a subsequent unaccompanied tour in WESTPAC.

2. Since January 1965 an estimated 384,000 Marines have served in Vietnam. During this period over 25,926 have volunteered to extend their tour in Vietnam for 6 months or more to obtain a 30-day leave.<sup>22</sup>

3. Deployment of almost one-third of the Marine Corps manpower resources in 13-month tours rapidly decreased turnaround time between unaccompanied tours for all Marines. Unaccompanied skill requirements are not evenly distributed among the 366 Marine Corps specialties. Therefore, complex management actions were required to furnish a 24-month accompanied tour between unaccompanied assignments to personnel with certain deprived skills such as logistic men, electronic calibration technicians, aircraft radar and

<sup>21</sup>Headquarters, United States Air Force, All Major Air Commands Message, 422/66, subject: Assignment of Personnel to Southeast Asia, 22 January 1966.

<sup>22</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Reference Notebook Item, 11-D-5/AO1C/gmm, Special 30 Day Leave Program, 29 March 1969.

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electric system technicians, and aircraft jet-engine mechanics. These actions included increasing input training, cross training, and adjustments of WESTPAC manning levels. These actions substantially reduced the deprived enlisted skill problem.

### (2) Early Release and Obligated Service

Since the days of the Korean War, DOD has authorized the individual Services to release personnel prior to the end of their obligated commitment for various reasons. For the convenience of the Government, these early releases were mainly for budgetary purposes so that total strength would not exceed personnel and appropriations limitations imposed annually by Congress, although early releases for individual benefit, such as acceptance in a university or seasonal employment, were also granted. The method of approach to early release programs was left almost exclusively to each Service Secretary to determine, as indicated in the following paragraphs.

#### (a) Army

1. Since the Korean War, the Army has separated overseas returnees from short-tour areas upon arrival in CONUS if they had 90 days or less (30 days or less from long-tour areas) remaining on current tour of active duty. This early release program was amended in July 1968 to permit men to leave the Army following their short tours if they were within 150 days of the normal end of their term of service. This policy avoided the problem of having soldiers assigned to CONUS units for periods short enough to limit their contribution to unit capabilities. Although this reduced personnel turbulence and helped the Army to improve readiness of forces outside of Vietnam by eliminating these short, nonproductive assignments, it caused a drastically higher annual loss rate.

2. Personnel were encouraged to voluntarily extend their tour of duty in the combat area, with a 30-day leave as an incentive to a 6-month extension; short-term extensions to create eligibility for separation under the 90/150-day early release program were also encouraged to promote stability.

#### (b) Navy

1. Early release of officer and enlisted personnel is used by the Navy as a tool of manpower management to reduce personnel turbulence that would be caused by the reassignment of returning Vietnam veterans with little obligated service remaining; to comply with such Service policies as permitting entry into college; and to provide additional personnel available for exposure to Vietnam service.

2. Assignment to Vietnam duty required the individual to have a 1-year minimum of obligated service remaining at the time of departure from CONUS. In many cases, this meant that only a short period of obligated service remained upon completion of a tour. Reassignment to other Navy activities under these conditions was counterproductive, unless the individual reenlisted or agreed to extend for a normal tour. Short-tour assignments were detrimental to the stability of the receiving command and operated to increase the turnover rate. Therefore, CHNAVPERS in 1966 provided a minor but significant option to returning Vietnam enlisted veterans: the election of discharge from active duty up to 90 days before normal expiration of enlistment. Later, this discharge was made automatic in the case of enlisted personnel having less than 90 days of obligated service remaining. In June 1967, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) by CNO message 241217Z June 1967 authorized an 180-day early separation policy for personnel completing a 1-year tour of duty in Vietnam. Unlike the automatic 90-day early separation policy, personnel completing Vietnam tours with 91 to 180 days of obligated service remaining were eligible to request separation. In December 1968, the policy was broadened to make the 180-day early release an automatic early separation, similar to the 90-day policy.

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### (c) Air Force

1. Current Air Force policies in effect regarding early release are as follows:

a. Up to a 90-day early release to meet a school entry date, not to exceed 10 days prior to registration, was denied to officers in short-tour areas but permitted for airmen regardless of area of assignment.

b. Whenever an individual has an established date of separation with less than 6 months to serve upon rotation to CONUS, he may request separation at the port with an early release of up to 6 months.

2. The Air Force used early releases as a normal procedure to adjust the inventory to stay within manpower ceilings established by OSD. The early release policy was most effective in the lower grade structures and has markedly reduced personnel turbulence among returnees from SE Asia.

### (d) Marine Corps

1. From 1965 through June 1968, the Marine Corps was not faced with the manpower problem of releasing large numbers of Marines prior to the normal expiration of their enlistment. Constraints imposed by man-year averages and end-strength limitations required the implementation of an early release program in 1969.

2. The early release program had no impact on WESTPAC units, since no Marines were short-toured for early release. However, a great deal of turbulence was created in CONUS units as abnormally large numbers of transfers were made to replace Marines being released.

### c. Civilianization Programs

(1) DOD Policy. Deployment of additional military personnel to Vietnam, general augmentation of active duty military strength, and increased readiness of Reserve forces led the Secretary of Defense to request the Services to survey closely their capacity for converting military spaces to civilian spaces to ensure that all military personnel were assigned to duties for which there was a direct military requirement. The general DOD manpower policies are prescribed in DOD Directive 1100.4, "Guidance for Manpower Programs," 20 August 1954. This directive states that civilian requirements will be determined on the basis of planning and workload factors, with overall strengths maintained at the minimum level necessary to accomplish the required tasks. Where both military and civilian personnel are required, net manpower requirements shall be determined and maximum stability of personnel will be maintained consistent with training, readiness, and morale requirements.

"Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not require military incumbents by reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved, and which do not entail hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment."<sup>23</sup>

### (2) Extent of Military-Civilian Mix

#### (a) Army

1. Department of the Army (DA) criteria for use of civilian personnel and for military-civilian position delineation are contained in Army Regulation 616-1, "Personnel

<sup>23</sup>Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Programs, 20 August 1954.

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Utilization—Manpower Management." Emphasis is placed on the use of civilian employees to assure continuity of administration and operation and to provide a nucleus of trained personnel necessary for expansion in any emergency. Civilian personnel free military personnel for their primary military skills; therefore, civilians are generally used in all positions that do not require military skills or military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, or discipline. On 12 August 1965 the Under Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces) stated that the Secretary of the Army had requested that a study be conducted to determine the number and types of military positions civilians could perform so that Army findings could be submitted to the Secretary of Defense by 23 August 1965. The directing memoranda stated that the conclusions of the DOD Military/Civilian Manpower Substitutability Study was that approximately 143,000 military spaces in the Army could be converted to civilian authorization. Based on this study and a series of subsequent meetings, certain proposals and decisions were made.<sup>24</sup>

2. The Army identified 28,500 military positions that were convertible to civilian occupancy, plus another 8,000 backup military spaces in trainee, transient, patient, and student categories that could be eliminated by virtue of conversion in the first phase of the civilianization program—January 1966 through June 1967. Thus, 28,500 civilians took over duties that had been performed by an equal number of military personnel, and another 8,000 military positions were eliminated. The result was a total reduction of 36,500 military spaces. In the second phase of the FY 68 program, the Army identified 7,094 positions for conversions to civilian occupancy and another 910 for elimination, a total reduction of 8,004 military spaces. The Army, by 30 June 1968, had eliminated 44,504 military spaces, for which 35,135 civilian positions were substituted.<sup>25</sup>

3. No military-civilian mix quota or percentage could be considered optimum. The military-civilian mix that should exist cannot be accurately determined when comparing current civilian assets with future military authorizations. Analysis of the most recent AFDP (May 1969) indicated that this plan is more responsive to Army defensewide planning than in previous years. However, certain disparities were revealed, such as civilian to military manpower ratios that must be adjusted and priorities that must be set to correct manpower deficiencies.

4. In recognizing the problem, the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, stated during the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations (1970):

"An old and recurring problem is the tendency to substitute civilians for soldiers—and vice versa—in essential administrative and support positions, as strength ceilings and the need for combat forces fluctuate. This seems to be cyclic, and inevitably produces the inefficiencies associated with any personnel turbulence."<sup>26</sup>

5. The Army's ability to provide qualified replacements to the overseas commands depends primarily on the establishment of an adequate rotation base. In FY 65, to maintain a properly balanced CONUS rotation base, approximately 60 percent of the military personnel in any particular MOS should have been in CONUS and the remaining 40 percent overseas. The overseas commands required approximately 4,250 enlisted military personnel in depot operations, maintenance, supply control, and stock accounting.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Headquarters, Army Materiel Command, Letter, subject: Military/Civilian Substitutability, 23 September 1965.

<sup>25</sup>Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army for Fiscal Year 1968, Final Draft, p. 49.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Appropriations for 1970, Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part 7, 1969, p. 130.

<sup>27</sup>Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Military Manpower Required to Support the Rotation Base, 18 August 1964.

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6. Since the U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) has a major role in supporting overseas requirements for logistical personnel in wholesale logistics, a review of the manpower aspects attendant to providing this support is considered pertinent. It is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain military staffing levels adequate for USAMC's assigned mission and to support concurrently the CONUS rotation base, particularly in the face of manpower policies that emphasize maximum utilization of civilians in the CONUS logistical complex. The establishment of military positions to provide a minimum rotation base must not deter the accomplishment of the primary mission of an activity or disrupt or preclude sound operational continuity. Military personnel assigned to such positions must be fully productive and not duplicate the work of other personnel. This policy, together with the continued austere USAMC military manpower authorizations, has occasioned a significant decline in military positions in CONUS logistical activities for production of qualified overseas replacements and utilization of overseas returnees. On 30 June 1965, out of a total USAMC manpower authorization of 162,852, 17,652 military spaces were authorized. By 30 June 1969 the total authorization was 172,913, with 14,571 military spaces.<sup>28</sup>

7. Elimination of certain CONUS military logistical spaces reduces the Army's capability to provide on-the-job experience to school-trained personnel. In many cases, support personnel assigned to Vietnam did not have the essential experience in such areas as depot operations, maintenance, and supply management. As a result, the Army relied heavily on U. S. citizens, local nationals, and contract personnel to make up deficiencies. Reliance upon civilians had a detrimental effect in some instances on the flexibility of logistical support operations in Vietnam. For example, during the Tet Offensive of 1968, a majority of the civilian force was absent from duty. A civilian work force does not always have the required degree of mobility; therefore, relocation of an activity becomes difficult. Civilian staffing in a combat zone must be highly selective.

8. The requirement for a rotation base is a valid factor in designating a space as military or civilian. The Army has found that the predominately civilian logistics operation in CONUS has inhibited its capability to train military personnel during peacetime and has weakened the rotation base necessary to maintain skills deployed overseas during wartime.

### (b) Navy

1. By November 1965, to comply with the DOD civilian substitution policy, the Navy had submitted its plan for Phase I of a two-phase substitution program. It was approved by the Secretary of Defense in December 1965.

2. The Navy's Phase I Program was scheduled to commence in March 1966. Originally designed to be effected over a 5-year period, it was compressed into 6 months. It provided for substitution of 12,500 civilians for 15,000 military personnel by the end of September 1966; of this number 1,575 were officer and 13,425 were enlisted billets. The Navy promulgated certain guidelines to be used in a Service-wide billet-by-billet review of shore activities: civilian replacements were to be available in the labor market; the work being done by a military man must be capable of being done in a civilian workweek; support of the operating forces must not be jeopardized; military career development must not be impaired; adequate funding must be provided.

3. Due to the late start in the fiscal year programming, action to make money available to hire civilians did not keep pace with the phase-out of military billets. Phase I was extended to 30 June 1967, by which time difficulties were resolved and some 94.3 percent of the 11,854 civilian replacements had been hired. This essentially completed Phase I.

<sup>28</sup>Headquarters Army Materiel Command, Army Materiel Command Authorization, 1 August 1962-30 June 1969, 28 October 1969.



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4. In April 1966, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) indicated a desire to continue the program. The Navy submitted an estimate of 13,829 additional military billets for which civilian substitution appeared to be feasible in FY 68. This estimate was not intended as a plan or program for action; nevertheless, this preliminary submission, which had been provided before a comprehensive field survey, was completed and returned to the Navy on 11 August as an approved program implementation. Phase II required the Navy to civilianize 658 officer and 12,181 enlisted billets, with an additional pipeline figure of 2,542 (transients, patients, prisoners, and trainees), for a total of 15,381 military billets to be phased out by the end of FY 68. By February 1968, 6,149 military personnel had been replaced by civilian hiring, about 47.9 percent of the total required. The Navy was experiencing excessive difficulty with hiring and, eventually, with funding restrictions. Not until 1 January 1969 was the Navy able to report that some 12,234 billets had been converted, about 96.3 percent of the planned program.

5. Civilianization problems were experienced primarily in funding and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in locating qualified civilian personnel with essential skills. The labor market was considered tight and adversely affected Phase II implementation. Since military billets were reduced on schedule and not tied to replacement by civilian personnel, the net result was an overall loss of manpower to the Service.

6. Despite the fact that one of the basic Navy guidelines was not to jeopardize the sea/shore rotation base, the civilian substitution program did exactly that. As a matter of general policy, the Navy plans toward an overall enlisted rotation of 4 years at sea and 2 years ashore. After Phase I, it was estimated that an additional 14,438 military billets ashore would be required if this rotation ratio was to be achieved. At the end of Phase II, an additional 17,379 billets would have been required.

7. Another aspect of the civilianization program that had minor long-range implications was the tendency of individual activities to offer billets for substitution where military personnel shortages had resulted in a vacancy for a substantial period. This was particularly true in the 5100 corps code category, Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers. Here civilianization of a number of junior officer billets created long-range imbalances in the military rank structure and reduced training and experience for middle management positions. From 1965 to 1968, the number of authorized civil engineer billets had expanded from 1,689 (including warrant officer and limited duty officers) to 2,148. Since first priority in assignment of officers was to newly established billets in South Vietnam and Thailand, many of the less critical billets were left vacant, as the overall staffing deficiency of the Corps was approximately 20 percent. Commands facing an indefinite hiatus in staffing of CEC billets abolished 103 peacetime junior officer billets through the mechanics of the civilian substitution program. The peacetime or permanent capability of the Corps has thereby been weakened from the standpoint of providing a training base for junior CEC officers. Responsiveness of the Corps to surge requirements, which involved gapping these billets for higher priority assignments of a temporary nature, has decreased.

8. With respect to other officer corps codes, no similar problem appears to have resulted. The largest percentage of officer billets converted from military to civilian were junior rank billets in the 1100 (Line) and 1300 (Line-Aviation) corps codes, with code 3100 (Supply) next. However, middle management billets were kept filled, and the 1100 and 1300 junior officer ranks are most easily expanded.

9. Civilianized enlisted billets were largely in two categories, Group V (Administrative and Clerical) and Group IX (Aviation), and in the lowest three paygrades. Normally, these two groups are well staffed and readily expendable, and no problems were occasioned either in the training base or experience levels. In Phase II some 4,784 Group V and 4,332 Group IX ratings were converted, illustrating the fact that these two groups took the preponderance of the program impact.

10. From a military standpoint, the civilianization program has had some adverse implications for meeting surge requirements; however, it would be difficult to



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document this except in given cases. The training base was expanding rapidly in all areas as a result of the buildup in SE Asia. The net result was to reduce the impact of civilian substitution on the training.

### (c) Air Force

1. The military-civilian substitution program in the U. S. Air Force was nicknamed MIX FIX and was implemented in two phases.<sup>29</sup> Phase I, initiated in the Air Force during January 1966, provided for reduction of 20,000 military (3,000 officer) spaces with a concomitant increase of 17,000 civilian spaces. Phase II, initiated in February 1966, provided for reduction of 15,910 military (438 officer) spaces accompanied by an increase of 14,018 civilian spaces.

2. Major Air Commands identified 2,300 officer and 57,000 airman positions as nonessential military positions following guidance and criteria contained in Air Force Regulation AFR 26-10, "Manpower Utilization." No consideration was given to overseas/CONUS rotation requirements in initially identifying positions. The 60,000 positions reported by the commands were subjected to Headquarters, USAF, analysis in consideration of rotational requirements, progression, and availability of skills in the civilian labor market. After all adjustment, schedules of conversions by major function were established and distribution of functional conversion schedules by major commands was made.

3. Phase I goals were achieved without major difficulties. The military ceiling was reduced and practically all of the civilian increase was reported to be hired. Phase II goals were not achieved. Although the military spaces were lost, additional civilians were never hired because of overall civilian ceiling cuts.

4. During the FY 68 budget review, civilian ceilings were set at 319,462 for FY 67 and 325,144 for FY 68. Air Force reclama to these ceilings requested increases of 4,000 and 8,700, respectively. Reclama was based on the fact that employment of 14,000 MIX FIX personnel within an overall ceiling increase of 6,000 (319,000 versus 325,000) could be accomplished only by separating 8,000 other employees, many of whom would be filling jobs of higher priority than the MIX FIX jobs. On 16 January 1967, the Secretary of Defense approved the requested ceiling increase without Bureau of the Budget (BOB) approval and without additional funds. The Air Force Director of the Budget made no effort to fund these spaces, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) would not concur in a request to BOB for approval of the ceiling change. As a result, the 8,700 spaces were lost in FY 68.

5. In October, the FY 68 ceiling was voluntarily reduced by the Air Force to 318,386 and further reduced by BOB/OSD to 316,856 during the FY 69 budget review.<sup>30</sup> In spite of the reduction of nearly 17,000 spaces (333,844 versus 316,856), OSD insisted that MIX FIX be completed on schedule.

6. The Air Force proceeded to civilianize as directed, however; the Air Staff was genuinely concerned with regard to the future effect that Project MIX FIX would have on the CONUS/overseas personnel rotational base, in addition to the effect already being experienced as a result of the growing conflict. Numerous CONUS positions had already been civilianized as a matter of exigency as military incumbents were withdrawn for duty in SE Asia and/or returned by direction to primary flying duties. As a result, there was a growing imbalance in the CONUS/overseas rotational base. Project MIX FIX involved additional civilianization of CONUS positions and further increased the already existing imbalance. The Secretary of the Air Force was kept advised of the situation and agreed in principle with the Air Staff that further civilianization would reduce the CONUS rotational base to a point where the military, who could not stay overseas indefinitely, would have few positions in which to maintain their overseas

<sup>29</sup>Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs and Resources), Memorandum, subject: Department of Defense Civilian Substitution Program (MIX FIX), 18 December 1969.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

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skill upon return to the CONUS and would in all likelihood have to cross train into new career fields. Currently there are 91 imbalanced airmen skills in the logistics area, 65 of which are attributed to the situation in SE Asia. <sup>31</sup>

7. The aerial port/air terminal system operated by MAC and PACAF was particularly affected by imbalances in transportation skills. The aerial port/air terminal is an integral part of all airlift systems. In PACAF, specifically in Vietnam, the most rapid expansion of the airlift system in history occurred. Terminal workloads in Vietnam have increased twentyfold since 1964. The number of aerial port squadrons located within PACAF increased from one to the present five, with the three squadrons located in Vietnam operating 35 detachments. Since January 1966 aerial port manpower tripled to a current high of over 3,000 personnel. Within PACAF, passenger, cargo, and mail increased from 17,000 short tons per month in 1965 to 275,000 short tons per month in 1969. This unprecedented expansion of the aerial port system created a vast drain on skilled and experienced military personnel from CONUS air terminals for assignment to SE Asia. The initial surge of requirements in 1965 exceeded Air Force personnel resources for trained transportation personnel, and it was necessary to largely civilianize CONUS terminals to maintain their stability and effectiveness. The CONUS air terminals underwent further civilianization in 1966 as the Air Force, in response to the Secretary of Defense's desire and direction, implemented Phase I of MIX FIX. These actions contributed to a severe CONUS/overseas personnel imbalance of transportation specialties due to the shortage of military transportation spaces in CONUS as compared to those overseas. Compounding this problem were the large numbers of personnel in PACAF serving in 12- to 13-month tour areas, i. e., Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan. Of the 14 primary transportation specialty classifications, 10 were listed as imbalanced as late as March 1969; only in 4 of 14 specialties are there adequate spaces in CONUS to provide positions for overseas returnees. This imbalance between CONUS and overseas positions required transportation personnel to spend an undue amount of time in the overseas area. It also results in poor morale, reduced career retention, and lower reenlistment rates, and does not provide a CONUS rotational base for currency and career progression of military transportation personnel.

### (d) Marine Corps

1. In accordance with basic DOD policy, the Marine Corps utilizes civilian personnel to meet the requirements for supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable. The Marine Corps has command and civilian ceiling sponsorship for more than 38 field activities grouped into Marine Corps bases, air activities, supply center, recruit depots, marine barracks, and miscellaneous activities. The civilian strength of these organizations is a function of baseload and workload as opposed to Marine Corps end strength. In response to the Secretary of Defense's Directive, the Marine Corps entered into a two-phase conversion program. <sup>32</sup> Phase I commenced on 28 October 1965 and replaced 2,800 military personnel with 2,500 civilian personnel. It was completed on 31 December 1966. Phase II involved replacement of 620 military billets with 522 civilians and commenced on 1 July 1967. This phase was halted in October 1967 because of budget reductions. However, as a result of the high priority placed on the conversion program by the Secretary of Defense, the program was reinstated and Phase II was completed on 30 June 1968.

2. Use of integrated Marine-Civilian T/Os within the Marine Corps has permitted effective utilization of the combined manpower resources. Table 13 illustrates the mix at the Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow. Although the ratio is approximately 1 serviceman to 2 civilians, most of the civilians are employed in ungraded billets.

<sup>31</sup>Headquarters, United States Air Force, Military Personnel Center, Airmen Management Division, Briefing, subject: Logistics Airmen Manning, presented to Worldwide Logistics Conference, Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico, 5 November 1969.

<sup>32</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Reference Notebook Item II-J-2/AO1E-4-jml, subject: Status and Effect of Military Civilian Conversion Program, 30 May 1968.

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TABLE 13  
MILITARY-CIVILIAN MIX AT  
MARINE CORPS SUPPLY CENTER, BARSTOW

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military (Officer/Enlisted)</u>	<u>Civilian (Graded/Ungraded)</u>
Service Administration Division	79/518	379/610
Material Division	23/370	335/726
Depot Maintenance Activity	10/194	124/716
Subtotal	112/1082	828/2052
Total	1194	2890

Source: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Tables of Organization 7011, 7012 and 7013, 1969.

3. A desirable military-civilian mix exists at the present time in the Marine Corps. This mix is under constant study to retain flexibility and responsiveness in the overall manpower management system required to meet the changing needs in procedures. The present mix is responsive to Marine Corps needs for an adequate rotation and training base.

#### 4. METHODS USED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS

a. General. The Services met Vietnam requirements in a number of ways. Between 1965 and 1968, the Secretary of Defense approved increases in the authorized fiscal-year end strengths of the Services, many of which were justified on grounds of Vietnam requirements. These increases permitted expansion of active-duty personnel resources by bringing additional officers and enlisted men into the Services. They also required the augmentation of training personnel and expansion of training facilities to handle the increased workload. Commitment of increasing numbers of military personnel to Vietnam, without a callup of Reserves, forced the Services to procure and train raw talent and to distribute not only these new recruits and inexperienced officers but also seasoned personnel so that worldwide forces could be maintained at maximum readiness. Active Army forces in CONUS were not adequate enough to provide all requirements for the expanded Vietnam commitment. It was necessary to draw down STRAF in Europe and other areas to provide experienced technicians and cadres for deploying forces and for expansion of the training base. A similar situation pertained in the other Services. The Navy requirement for additional ships in the Pacific could be met by commissioning new ships, recommissioning old ships, and rotating a number of LANTFLT ships to the Pacific. Existing units, such as NMCBs, were used to fill stated requirements and additional units were organized to meet the increases that were generated as requirements increased. In all Services, the great majority of requirements for personnel were met by a reorientation of manpower priorities. Where feasible, increased civilian hire and contractor services were employed in-country to ease the requirement for military personnel. The following paragraphs amplify methods used by the Services to meet personnel requirements resulting from the SE Asia buildup.

#### b. Restructuring of Forces

##### (1) Army

(a) The Army reorganized and deployed two logistical commands to WEST-PAC: the 1st Logistical Command to South Vietnam to serve as the key logistic operator in that country, and the 2d Logistical Command to Okinawa as the major logistic operation in USARPAC for backup of SE Asia. In addition, it was necessary to activate, equip, train, and deploy new

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Active Army units. As an example, during 1965, the following number of units, company and detachment size, required activation in CONUS:

TABLE 14  
DEPLOYED AND ACTIVATED ARMY UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Deployed or Alerted</u>	<u>Activated*</u>
Ordnance	58	19
Signal	71	54
Quartermaster	83	74
Medical	79	43
Engineer	118	63
Transportation	123	72
Military Police	25	18
Chemical	8	1
Psychological Warfare	5	5
Adjutant General	19	9
Finance	12	9

\*Included in units deployed or alerted.

Source: Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Data Compilation from Troop Basis File, 1969.

(b) The limited and incremental strength increases authorized for Army forces in Vietnam during the buildup required logistical forces to be structured sparingly. In this way COMUSMACV could retain maximum combat strength. This created repetitive demands for small cellular teams that were not available in the Army force structure. By 30 September 1965, 465 new units had been activated in the CONUS, 83 percent of which were smaller than company size.<sup>33</sup> The time required for the attendant activations, inactivations, and reorganizations was not compatible with the time available between major unit deployment decisions and in-country closing dates.

(c) The shortage of experienced personnel in a number of skills precluded expanding the training base rapidly enough to accommodate heavy increases in untrained input. It was necessary to assign unit recruit training missions to four STRAF divisions. This diversion of mission seriously impaired overall operational readiness. Over a 2-year period (late 1965 through June 1967), 77,200 new accessions received basic combat training and 67,800 received advanced individual training through the unit recruit training program assigned to STRAF.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup>Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army Buildup Progress Report (U), 30 August 1966, p. 47 (SECRET).

<sup>34</sup>Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1966, 1967.

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### (2) Navy

(a) Requirements for Navy manpower to increase logistics support operations at sea did not require the restructuring of Navy organizational units. To meet the needs of the Seventh Fleet, ships were diverted from the Atlantic. Personnel augmentations increased the manning level of these ships. However, the establishment of two in-country major overseas logistical support activities—NSA, Saigon, and NAS, Da Nang, both with a number of smaller detachments scattered throughout the several CTZs, required the assignment of large numbers of personnel to entirely new organizations.

(b) The nature of operational tasks assigned to the Navy in the coastal waters, rivers, and streams of South Vietnam reoriented the employment of many Navy personnel to the repair, maintenance, and operation of small craft. MARKET TIME (coastal surveillance) and GAME WARDEN (river patrol) operations, as well as riverine operations with Army forces, required assignment and training of hundreds of junior line officers and nearly 3,000 enlisted men, many of them in skilled ratings and top paygrades.

(3) Air Force. It was not necessary for the Air Force to make any major realignment of personnel to support increased hostilities in SE Asia. Manpower requirements were satisfied from existing forces and organizations.

### (4) Marine Corps.

(a) The nucleus of trained Marines for building the 5th Marine Division and other temporary units was obtained by drawing trained personnel from CONUS Fleet Marine Forces (FMFs) and many non-FMF activities.

(b) In order to provide a logistic organization capable of satisfying the expanding needs of III MAF and to make optimum use of available logistic assets, a Force Logistics Command (FLC) was established by restructuring existing forces on 15 March 1965. This provisional command was created by expansion of the existing Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) arrangement, and employed the assets of one full-strength force service regiment, two Marine division service battalions, one force separate bulk fuel company, and an augmentation of approximately 300 billets. In essence, the service battalions of the two Marine divisions became the Logistic Support Group and the organization of the 1st Force Service Regiment (FSR) provided the framework for the headquarters and the heavy logistic activity of the FLC. By adopting existing T/Os the Marine Corps retained the flexibility for later reconstituting the original organizations and preserve the character of Marine forces deployed. The matrix of the FLC provisional T/O provided the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing functions and situations, yet permitted the command to remain within authorized strength ceilings. To sustain the operational initiative of III MAF, the FLC grew proportionately with increases in the operational forces. The following average monthly strengths obtained from the FLC depict this growth.

June 1966	4,288
January 1967	6,744
June 1967	9,700
January 1968	9,551
June 1968	10,398
January 1969	9,512

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### c. Drawdowns of Military Personnel

(1) General. The principal method used to meet manpower requirements in SE Asia was to draw down personnel from military activities in CONUS and other parts of the world.

#### (2) Army.

(a) Requirements for additional support units developed more rapidly than the Army's capacity to procure and train personnel. A primary constraint on the rate at which new accessions could be brought on duty was the availability of experienced personnel with the proper skills to expand the training base. The Army was faced not only with the problem of training hundreds of thousands of entry-level skills; it would also have to provide additional training in lieu of skill progressions normally acquired by on-the-job experience. In order to provide experienced leaders and highly skilled technicians for expansion of the training base and to man units for deployment in Vietnam, it was necessary not only to draw down STRAF but also U. S. Army forces in Europe, Korea, and other areas. With Vietnam and the training base both competing for the limited trained personnel resources, it was necessary to establish priorities. First priority was established for sustaining the forces in Vietnam; and second, for expanding the training centers. In order to accommodate the heavy increase in untrained input into the Active Army in late 1965 and early 1966, special training efforts were required such as a unit recruit training mission assigned to the STRAF. This extensive unit recruit training mission, together with continuous levies on STRAF for skilled personnel, had a direct impact on their overall readiness condition.

(b) The strengths of Europe and Korea were materially reduced to provide skilled personnel for Vietnam, for the training base, and for the activation of new units. For example, the reductions in assigned strength of the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), were as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Commissioned Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Personnel</u>
30 September 1965 <sup>34</sup>	16,460	2,008	216,364
30 June 1966 <sup>35</sup>	13,151	1,886	193,070

By 31 March 1967 the officer overall strength had been further reduced to 11,205; however, the enlisted strength had been increased to 214,692.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the total USAREUR strength had been restored to about mid-1965 level; but the officer content of that restored strength was about 32 percent lower than that of September 1965. The overall strength reduction in Europe and continued qualitative degradation would appear to have severely impaired personnel readiness. However, the reported personnel readiness condition in June 1967 for all five of the divisions was RECON C2—each of the divisions was capable of performing the full TOE mission for which it was organized, but each had minor deficiencies that reduced its ability to conduct sustained operations.

(c) The situation in Korea was similar to that in Europe. The continued reduction in strengths of experienced personnel in Korea was reflected in the readiness condition of the two divisions there. In June 1967 the reported personnel readiness of both U. S. divisions in Korea was less favorable than that reported for the European divisions for the same date.

<sup>34</sup>Headquarters, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER - 46 Report, 30 September 1965, p. 7.

<sup>35</sup>Headquarters, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER - 46 Report 30 June 1966, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup>Headquarters, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER - 46 Report, March 1967, p. 7.

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(3) Navy. Primary responsibility for meeting enlisted in-country requirements was assigned to CINCPACFLT. When acute shortages developed in the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), CHNAVPERS provided relief by drafting personnel from LANTFLT and shore activities, absorbing volunteer personnel at first priority. These drafts were used not only to maintain minimum manning levels in PACFLT but for direct assignment to in-country activities. As SE Asia requirements continued to increase, normal LANTFLT accessions were diverted to the Pacific after training in LANTFLT schools. Further drawdowns were experienced by LANTFLT in order to augment ships to higher manning levels before deployment or rotation to the Seventh Fleet, and to provide personnel for ships commissioned on the east coast destined for assignment to the Pacific. Tables 15 and 16 indicate major drafts that CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT levied against type commanders for Vietnam personnel requirements.

TABLE 15

### ATLANTIC FLEET ENLISTED PERSONNEL DRAFTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Numerical Loss</u>
Jul 65	SE Asia requirements	4,500
Apr-Dec 66	SE Asia requirements	5,836
Jul-Nov 67	SE Asia requirements	1,009
Nov 67-Jun 68	Program 5 and 6 requirements for experienced personnel for SE Asia, plus the reactivation of USS NEW JERSEY.	4,381
Oct-Dec 68	Early release of enlisted personnel with 2 years active duty of 6-year obligation.	13,000
Oct-Dec 69	Same	22,000 (estimated)

Source: Captain H. W. Drum, USN, Staff, CINCLANTFLT, Letter to Captain C. E. Landis, USN, Staff, JLRB, 28 November 1969.

TABLE 16

### PACIFIC FLEET ENLISTED PERSONNEL DRAFTS

<u>Year</u>	<u>E-5 and above</u>	<u>E-4 and below</u>	<u>Total</u>
1966	900	3,200	4,100
1967	1,500	4,500	6,000
1968	1,700	4,000	5,700
1969	300	800	1,000
Total	4,400	12,500	16,900

Source: Lt. Commander G. F. Nottoli, USN, Staff, CINCPACFLT Code 73, Memorandum for Captain C. E. Landis, USN, JLRB, 22 January 1970.

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These tables do not indicate the extent of the utilization of normal PACFLT personnel availabilities assigned to Vietnam. Drafting the fleet is a last recourse action, and every effort was expended by the Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office, Pacific, to meet Vietnam manning requirements from personnel made available by the CHNAVPERS for general assignment in PACFLT. In a sense then, this, too, constituted a drawdown on the PACFLT, since these personnel normally would have been assigned to ships and squadrons.

(4) Air Force. The conflict in South Vietnam did not necessitate restructuring the existing Air Force organization. Project HEAVYDRAW, later changed to CRESTED CAP, redistributed Air Force overseas assets in line with the higher priority accorded SE Asia. In addition, deactivation of selected CONUS and overseas units was accelerated in order to generate additional personnel resources to feed the demands of SE Asia. Authorized crew manning ratios in remaining units were reduced, minimizing the non-SE Asia requirement for personnel. Certain less critical positions in other overseas areas were left vacant in order to conserve the personnel resource for use in SE Asia. Detailed information regarding exact numbers, skills, and degree of degradation of combat effectiveness sustained by non-SE Asia units as a result of these drawdowns is classified and cannot be included here.

### (5) Marine Corps

(a) In 1965 the initial personnel buildup of units in South Vietnam caused shortages in both the 3d FSR and 3d Service Battalion on Okinawa. Under the circumstances existing at the time, the 3d Service Battalion furnished such personnel as it could; and personnel deficiencies in the Brigade Logistics Support Group/Logistics Support Group (BLSG/LSG) were filled as best they could be by the 3d FSR. On 1 June 1966 the FLC had 60 percent of its officers and 79 percent of its authorized strength; by 30 June 1966 the FLC was at 90 percent strength.<sup>37</sup> As additional personnel were made available to FMFPAC, actual FLC strength increased to full provisional T/O where it was maintained. However, to meet its Vietnam requirements the Marine Corps had to institute a heavy drawdown from other areas to provide essential personnel skills, including units in Hawaii, the west coast of the United States, and FMF, Atlantic.

(b) Marine Corps manpower for SE Asia was authorized at levels equivalent to SE Asia deployment of forces programs ceilings; however, personnel were not instantly available or deployable in the optimum mix of grades and skills. Extensive management was required to compensate for deployable skill shortages. Shortages of skilled personnel caused a drawdown in other units in order to provide trained personnel to deploying units. Commencing in 1965, a rapid buildup of forces was implemented without benefit of Reserve callup. Consequently, the nucleus of trained personnel, around which new units were built, had to come from the existing manpower inventory. Such a buildup required the qualitative drawdown of trained personnel from the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and many other non-FMF activities to the 5th Marine Division. In addition, the 1st Marine Division, which was manned at less than T/O strength, required rapid expansion at the partial expense of CONUS units. Programs were developed to provide training for new personnel for support of CONUS forces. Expansion of manpower requirements at Marine Corps bases and support facilities providing training and logistical support for SE Asia prompted a drawdown on tenant activities through increased FMF assistance. Many FMF assistance billets are of such an essential nature that the incumbent should not be disengaged for deployment. These include instructor billets at infantry training regiments at Marine Corps Bases, Camp Pendleton, California, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

### d. Use of Civilians in South Vietnam

#### (1) General

(a) The rapid buildup in logistical requirements in South Vietnam, coupled with restrictive ceilings on deployment of military personnel, necessitated extensive use of civilian manpower to supplement logistical support furnished by military units.

<sup>37</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam, March 1965, Volume I, p. III-71.



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(b) The problems in obtaining civilian personnel, both direct-hire and contract-hire, were general in nature. The Vietnamese manpower pool could not provide adequate numbers of personnel with the required skills to meet the needs of construction and facilities maintenance contractors and military forces. The utilization of TCNs to help fill this void was constantly hampered by Vietnamese governmental restrictions and time-consuming clearance processes. On numerous occasions, civilian facilities maintenance personnel, contract- and direct hire Vietnamese, were unable to perform their work due to enemy attacks and curfews. The best example of this problem occurred during the Tet Offensive of 1968, when most of the large base areas serviced by civilian forces were subjected to Vietcong attack and a government curfew kept civilians at home.

### (2) Army

(a) The Army relied heavily on U.S. and local national civilian employees to support Army logistical activities overseas. TCNs were imported into a given area only to the extent necessary to provide skills unobtainable from local sources. For example, as of 31 May 1969, the extent of civilianization in USARV of selected major logistical activities is shown in Table 17.

TABLE 17

#### USARV PERSONNEL IN KEY LOGISTICAL UNITS

<u>Logistical Unit</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>U. S. Civilian</u>	<u>Vietnamese</u>	<u>Third-Country Nationals</u>
Da Nang Support Command	233	7	924	0
Qui Nhon Support Command	746	8	2,539	0
Qui Nhon Depot	1,937	43	1,261	0
Cam Ranh Bay Support Command	245	9	2,132	0
Cam Ranh Bay Depot	1,615	44	1,020	0
Saigon Support Command	844	52	3,798	0
Long Binh Depot	2,562	63	3,228	0
Inventory Control Center, Vietnam	372	171	115	0
U. S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam	94	51	77	0
Marine Maintenance Activity	474	0	39	0
Aviation Materiel Management Agency	150	0	70	0
Engineer Construction Agency	534	18	62	1
U. S. Army Headquarters Area Command	660	42	3,092	7

Source: Department of the Army. Report RCSCSGPA-523, Personnel Subject to Manpower Authorization Voucher, 31 May 1969.

(b) The buildup in SE Asia created an unplanned workload in the logistical area that could not be handled under normal authorized TOE. The Army developed the Quick Reaction Team Program, which provided temporary logistic support of in-country efforts. These quick reaction teams were invaluable in resolving supply problems created by the lack of skilled military personnel and the sudden influx of supplies and equipment. These teams, normally provided by USAMC, were composed of highly trained personnel, who were utilized to fulfill technical requirements beyond the capabilities of the local command. In 1967, 422 technicians

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and 453 volunteer DA civilians were serving on these teams in Vietnam. Also, to provide technical guidance, USAMC established a customer assistance office in Vietnam staffed with highly skilled volunteer professional logisticians from USAMC subordinate commands.

(c) The buildup of combat forces in Vietnam found the Army's in-country facilities maintenance capability vested in the resources of its contractor, Pacific Architectural and Engineering, Inc. (PA&E). The existence of this contract, combined with the DOD objective of minimizing the number of support troops in-country, required the Army to rely almost entirely on PA&E for facilities maintenance support. The work force provided under the PA&E contract consisted of U.S. civilians, TCNs, and local nationals (LNs). LNs provided the bulk of the common labor force; TCNs (mostly Koreans and Filipinos) were utilized in the skilled positions; and U.S. civilians performed supervisory functions. The work-force mix was approximately 5 percent U.S. civilians, 15 percent TCNs, and 80 percent LNs. As of 31 December 1969, the work-force mix of 15 major contractors was 1,959 U.S. civilians, 8,117 TCNs, and 31,076 LNs.<sup>38</sup>

(d) In early 1967, the Army decided to provide a group of supply assistance personnel, under the code name Project COUNTER, to upgrade available logistical personnel capabilities. The increased combat force required greater reliance on fewer supply and storage management personnel. Qualified individuals to perform these tasks in the field were generally in short supply; requirements for trained personnel, particularly military, exceeded their availability in most cases. In an effort to cope with the problem, intensified training of selected personnel was undertaken with assistance from civilian technicians and contract personnel. These procedures permitted attainment of basic requirements for sophisticated inventory management and operating methods. Similar methods were used in the maintenance area. The Closed Loop Program, direct support teams, and interservice support agreements further assisted in easing the effects of the personnel shortage. Four Project COUNTER teams were provided during 1967-1968 and proved invaluable in upgrading the short-term technical competence throughout the command. Team strength is indicated in Table 18.

TABLE 18

### PROJECT "COUNTER" TEAM STRENGTH

<u>Number</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Time Period</u>
I	500	Jan-Jun 67
II	133	Jun-Dec 67
III	422	Feb-Jul 68
IV	236	Jul-Dec 68

Source: Department of the Army, CHALLENGE, Compendium of Army Accomplishment, A Report By the Chief of Staff (U), March 1968 (SECRET).

### (3) Navy

(a) The Navy employed U.S. Civil Service personnel, LNs, and TCNs, and used contract personnel for services, particularly in construction work, throughout South Vietnam. TCNs included Filipinos and Koreans imported in considerable numbers. Raymond-Morrison-Knudson, Brown and Root, and J.A. Jones formed a combined (RMK-BRJ) for contract

<sup>38</sup>Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Message 191218Z January 1970, subject: Personnel Employed by U.S. Contractors.

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construction work, which by 30 June 1966 had a work force totaling 51,700, including 4,300 U.S. nationals. This combine performed work for the military, MAP, and AID. As the requirement for services expanded rapidly, use of contract services was steadily increased. At Qui Nhon the Han Jin Transportation Company of Seoul, Korea (Korean Express) provided stevedoring functions, vehicular maintenance, drivers, and management and supervisory personnel for beach clearance and local haul. At Nha Trang and Vung Tau, the Alaska Barge and Transport Company provided assistance with port clearance and local haul. Han Jin Korean Express provided stevedoring services at Da Nang port. In Saigon, hundreds of local nationals were employed in the port area as stevedores. The Equipment Rental Company, a division of Sea-Land Services, Inc., assisted with cargo handling into and out of Saigon port and point-to-point within Vietnam, furnishing heavy trucks and maintenance and repair shops for its own equipment. To assist in the solution of highly technical problems with modern and complex electronic and weapons systems, COM-SERVPAC arranged visits by technical support teams. In addition to stevedoring and technical services, extensive use was made of civilian labor at NSA, Saigon, and NSA, Da Nang, to perform a myriad of menial messing and janitorial tasks, thus freeing additional military personnel resources for combat duties.

(b) The increase of Navy civilian personnel in South Vietnam is shown in Table 19. Statistics prior to this time are fragmentary. PACFLT Personnel Strength Reports provided the statistics for June 1966 to June 1969.

TABLE 19

### NAVY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Jun 66</u>	<u>Jun 67</u>	<u>Jun 68</u>	<u>Jun 69</u>
U. S. Civil Service	39	83	103	120
Indigenous	2,968	5,316	7,237	10,593
Contract	2,455	4,020	5,850	7,170
U. S. Citizen	171	545	570	581
Indigenous	694	1,484	2,492	2,508
Third Country	1,590	1,991	2,788	4,081

Source: Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific, J-4 Staff, Interview held in January 1970.

#### (4) Air Force

(a) Civilian Manpower Ceilings. The civilian manpower authorized and utilized by the Air Force in support of its operations in South Vietnam is shown in Table 20.

(b) Contract Engineering and Technical Services. The purpose of Contract Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) is to provide services for commercial or industrial companies that provide liaison, advice, instruction, and training to Air Force personnel in the engineering, installation, operation, supply, and maintenance of Air Force equipment and systems. These services included the knowledge necessary to develop among Air Force personnel the technical skills required for maintaining and operating such equipment in a high state of military readiness. The utilization of CETS and the presence of Field Service Representatives (FSRs) are commonplace procedure throughout Air Force logistic activities. No substantive changes in either policy or use of these services were precipitated by SE Asia operations. Table 21 shows numbers of CETS, their average man-month costs and the year of service. The third and fourth quarters of FY 70 are estimates.

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TABLE 20

### AIR FORCE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>April 65</u>	<u>April 66</u>	<u>April 67</u>	<u>April 68</u>	<u>April 69</u>	<u>April 70</u>
U. S.	23	77	119	141	147	139
Foreign Nationals/ Direct Hire	254	1,240	9,769	10,821	10,324	9,423
Total	277	1,317	9,883	10,962	10,471	9,562

Source: Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff (Systems and Logistics), Director of Manpower and Organization, Memorandum, 19 December 1969.

TABLE 21

### CONTRACT ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>	<u>Average Cost Per Man-Month (Dollars)</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
1965	2,671,949	1,702.00	163
1966	4,339,115	2,436.00	183
1967	5,775,785	2,491.00	236
1968	7,146,827	2,731.00	273
1969	5,511,627	2,734.00	210
1970 (Estimated)	4,296,136	2,930.00	172
1971 (Programmed)	2,466,020	3,400.00	65

Source: Colonel A. P. Hamner, USAF, Chief, Plans and Policy Division, Directorate of Maintenance Engineering, Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics, Interview held at Headquarters USAF, 19 December 1969.

(c) Field Service Representatives/Contract Maintenance. The Air Force contracts for FSRs as required to provide liaison and advice on new and complex weapon systems/equipments. Manufacturers provide these representatives only when included as a contract requirement. Approximately 50 percent of depot maintenance is accomplished by service contract because in-house capabilities are inadequate. This procedure is in compliance and conformity with DOD Directive 4151.1, which states that normally mission-essential functions will be accomplished in-house and nonmission-essential functions will be contracted.

#### (5) Marine Corps

(a) Contract Field Services. The Marine Corps has made very limited use of local-hire civilians to provide logistical services in South Vietnam. However, Contract Field Services (CFS)—engineering and technical services provided by commercial or industrial companies by trained qualified engineers and technicians—were utilized in FMF units in WESTPAC to assure operational readiness. CFS personnel in WESTPAC are working primarily in the Communication/Electronics field where military personnel cannot meet hard-skill technical

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requirements. WESTPAC use of CFS personnel has been minimal. Twenty technicians were used in South Vietnam, nine in Okinawa, and two in Hawaii, for a total of 31 in support of FMF units in SE Asia.<sup>39</sup>

(b) Foreign National Employees. During fiscal year 1969 the Marine Corps civilian personnel strength was increased by 1,942 people. These employees are South Vietnamese who are working in messhalls and maintenance shops and performing housekeeping functions to support the Marine activity in South Vietnam.

(c) Civil Service. The Marine Corps has not employed any civil service employees in South Vietnam. However, there are 97 non-SE Asia billets authorized in Okinawa and Japan.

### e. Impact of Methods Used to Meet Requirements

(1) General. Fulfilling the high-priority personnel requirements for the Vietnam conflict without mobilization of the Reserve forces resulted in significant degradation of readiness of forces in other areas of the world. The decision not to call up the Reserve forces deprived the military services of a reservoir of trained personnel and organized units, which could have been drawn upon to meet the burgeoning requirements associated with the force buildup. Each of the military services thereafter depended principally on drawdowns from Active Forces hastily augmented with thousands of new personnel to meet SE Asia requirements. The initial impact of these requirements in SE Asia was to produce overall shortages of experienced and skilled personnel in all Services, with an attendant requirement to expand the training base as rapidly as possible to handle new accessions. The drawdowns to obtain personnel with expertise and the instability generated by increased personnel turbulence and a major influx of new, largely untrained officers and men combined to dilute the operational and logistic capability of worldwide military commands and organizations. Although this degradation in capability and readiness varied in degree among the Services and within the Services among organizations, it was sufficiently universal to be categorized as general. The adjustment period took about 2 years. By late 1967 the Services had developed the personnel plans, policies, and procedures necessary to provide a sustaining base for SE Asia requirements.

### (2) Army

(a) When Reserve mobilization did not materialize, the imbalances in the Army's Active Force structure quickly became apparent. This structure lacked sufficient support forces and in-depth strength in many skill specialties. New units had to be created from active elements and large numbers of recruits brought on duty and trained. This process entailed institution of a massive training program and reassignment of many individuals with those secondary skills required by the new units.

(b) By the opening months of FY 67 the major problems in the Army had been largely overcome, particularly in expansion of the training base. The infusion of this base, as well as ready units in CONUS, with returning Vietnam veterans was of substantial assistance in increasing readiness. Quantitatively, the Army's training establishment had undergone a major expansion. On any given day during FY 67 over 200,000 personnel were in various stages of training at 26 schools and 16 training centers. During the 3-year period from June 1965 through June 1968, over one million officers and enlisted personnel were brought into the Active Army, trained, and assimilated into active units. The expansion of the Army and the buildup in SE Asia both reached a crest early in FY 69, and in the remainder of the year appropriate adjustments were made in the training picture.

(c) The primary mission of STRAF was to maintain combat readiness to respond to contingencies on a worldwide basis. In April 1965, when the substantial drawdown of STRAF forces began, approximately one-third of the command was composed of logistical and

<sup>39</sup>Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps, Verbal Report of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to Develop a Contractor Field Services Personnel Replacement Program for the Marine Corps, January 1970.

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administrative personnel. This was not a balanced force, as plans called for rounding out units with Reserve personnel. Under the impact of drawdowns, logistical and administrative forces accounted for approximately one-fifth of overall forces by the end of FY 66. Unit readiness was further degraded by drastic imbalances in enlisted grades and military occupational specialties. There were shortages of officers in all grades except lieutenant. The continued levies on STRAF personnel resources through 1966 precluded significant improvement in readiness posture. The shortage of experienced personnel in the proper skills precluded expanding the training base rapidly enough to accommodate heavy increases in untrained input and required the use of additional training resources. The heavy unit recruit training missions assigned to these STRAF divisions seriously impaired their overall readiness condition.

(d) USAREUR was called on to provide many trained troops and specialists with critical skills in the combat service support area. As a result, combat unit personnel were diverted to perform maintenance, supply, and housekeeping tasks. Reassignments increased personnel turbulence, created excessive training and retraining workloads, and aggravated shortages in critical skills. For example, when the reduction in strength of supervisory enlisted specialists (paygrade E-5 decreased by 6,500 from 1965 to 1967<sup>40</sup>) is combined with the severe reduction of experienced officers (decreased 5,255 from September 1965 to March 1967),<sup>41</sup> the requirement for extensive grade substitution causing unit degradation becomes apparent.

(e) In the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC), the impact of methods used to support Vietnam requirements varied. In the Eighth Army in Korea, shortages of qualified personnel degraded operational readiness; but, as might be expected, United States Army, Ryukyus, and United States Army, Japan, benefited from an influx of logistical personnel, improvement in physical capabilities, and modernization of methods. In general, an overall evaluation of the operational readiness of USARPAC concluded that, despite the problems associated with cutbacks and drawdowns of personnel, equipment, and funding during the period of the Vietnam buildup, subordinate commands outside of SE Asia had the capacity and ingenuity to respond to new situations and continued to accomplish their assigned missions.

(f) The peacetime policies under which the buildup was accomplished resulted in a vast increase in the pipeline personnel strength; however, a large number of these personnel (transients and students) could have been recovered in an emergency situation. Pipeline personnel (trainee, transient, patient, or student/cadet) are not available for duty as part of the operating strength of the structured elements of the Army, but are normally included in the Army program budget requests. Prisoners, another category of nonavailable duty personnel, are not included in the Army programs, but their numbers grew to sizable proportions during the Vietnam buildup. At the end of June 1965 about 22 percent of the Army's total strength was not available for duty. This had increased by 30 June 1969 to 38 percent. Although this may appear to be insignificant in an Army of over one million, the impact of the entire number of personnel in a TTPS status is perhaps more significant when seen in relationship to the operating force.

### (3) Navy

(a) The buildup in SE Asia required assignment of substantial numbers of junior officers with 3 to 5 years of experience and technically trained, mature, experienced enlisted personnel. Many of the latter were in the top three paygrades and from ratings in short supply, such as storekeepers, electronics technicians, enginemen, etc. More than two-thirds of the over 38,000 Navy personnel in South Vietnam and coastal waters at the height of military operations were combat forces; well over 10,000 officers and enlisted men were assigned to logistical support organizations. Both combat and logistical support activities of the Navy drew heavily upon the same sources for officer and enlisted personnel. Required logistical specialists were available for the most part, although there were some shortages. It was the large drawdown on the line officer and enlisted groups that impacted most heavily on readiness of activities outside SE Asia.

<sup>40</sup>Headquarters, United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER-46 Report, Part I, 30 September 1965, p. 18; 30 June 1967, p. 22.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

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TABLE 22  
ACTIVE ARMY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Month, Year	Total	Operational Forces						
		Operational Forces	Combat	Combat Support	Support Forces	Special Activities	Training Forces	Transients Pris - Pats
June 1965	969,066	603,192	386,479	216,713	88,415	62,846	189,027	25,586
June 1966	1,199,784	648,969	407,131	241,838	104,468	66,515	338,271	41,561
June 1967	1,442,498	793,893	481,374	312,519	124,951	67,444	317,012	139,198
June 1968	1,570,343	794,011	485,141	308,870	116,125	61,252	418,457	180,498
June 1969	1,512,169	770,721	482,375	288,445	94,156	66,139	404,376	176,777

Source: Headquarters, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER-144 Report, 30 June 1969.

(b) Priority for personnel and manning policies in effect assured the flow of top talent to in-country activities. Without the Reserve forces to meet or offset these quantity and quality requirements, personnel drawdowns on ships and shore activities not directly related to South Vietnam increased the already critical shortages. The resultant gradual degradation in material and operational readiness was particularly registered in LANTFLT, but it was also felt in varying degrees by the Navy's European Command and the Sixth Fleet. Concurrently, there was an increase in PACFLT readiness, particularly in those activities operating in direct support of the war in SE Asia. The Seventh Fleet was brought to a high degree of combat readiness. Shore activities in the Philippines, Guam, Okinawa, and Japan were substantially augmented.

(c) Personnel turbulence, induced by the 1-year tour policy, the requirement for contact relief, en route training, and preferential duty assignment upon completion of a Vietnam tour, was greatly increased. The general impact was exaggerated by low personnel retention rates, and, commencing in 1968, by massive reductions in the on-board Navy personnel strength as cutbacks were ordered for economic reasons. Until 1968 losses of experienced personnel, coupled with increases in end strength, required larger recruit and junior officer inputs, increased the training load, and reduced the experience level. Assignment of these personnel as replacements for more experienced officers and enlisted men drained off to meet SE Asia requirements also had its effect on maintenance and operational capability. A trickle of new commissionings provided for a minor increase in modern ships but this, too, increased the demand for highly trained and experienced personnel.

(d) The hardest hit by personnel drawdowns was LANTFLT, which, in the words of Commander in Chief Admiral Holmes, became "in effect a holding company for personnel, ships, training and supply."<sup>42</sup> Drawdowns of personnel, rotation of Atlantic-based ships to SE Asia, permanent transfer of a number of Service force ships, requirement for personnel for new commissionings, losses of ships through decommissionings, and ships in reduced operational status because of personnel shortages all contributed to reduced LANTFLT readiness. In 1967, CNO told the Defense Subcommittee of the House Armed Forces Committee:

"The Atlantic Fleet is contributing significantly to the support of our effort in Southeast Asia. We have transferred a substantial number of their personnel and

<sup>42</sup> Headquarters, Commander United States Naval Forces Atlantic, Letter, Admiral Holmes to General Besson, subject: Comments on Impact of Vietnam War on the Atlantic Command (U), 28 July 1969 (TOP SECRET).

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selected units to augment the Seventh Fleet. While doing this, however, we have maintained the capability to meet LANTFLT's commitments to NATO. Nevertheless, we cannot but be more concerned with conditions where a sudden demand for substantial forces could more easily over-extend our resources."<sup>43</sup>

(e) By November 1969 some 91 LANTFLT ships were in the C-4 category (not operationally ready) due to shortages of trained personnel, a substantial portion of which could be attributed to drawdowns to meet SE Asia requirements.

(4) Air Force. The Air Force commitment of airlift, fighter, and attack aircraft units and the activation of some 20 new special operations and tactical air control squadrons drew down air crews and support personnel from all other areas. Turbulence was increased by the policy that no personnel would be required to do an involuntary second tour until all others with similar qualifications had served a tour in Vietnam. The number of officers eligible for overseas duty was limited in many specialties. Waiver of assignment restrictions, substitution of grade levels, and en route training became routine. Eventually, the high turnover rate to meet tour policies resulted in a program (PALACE GATE) that reassigned pilots from support functions to cockpit duty. This resulted in the loss of many qualified middle managers (lieutenant colonels and majors) in all support specialties, but particularly supply.

### (5) Marine Corps

(a) The Marine Corps was well organized to undertake the rapid deployment of combat forces to South Vietnam. Its logistical organization to support deployment was well balanced, although not large in size. Considerable advantage accrued to the deployed Marine Corps forces from their ability to use Navy and Army in-country logistic organizations, which partially reduced the Marine Corps' need to deploy additional personnel with logistical skill specialties.

(b) In general, the rapid buildup of Marine Corps forces impacted on the operational readiness of organizations outside of SE Asia in the same manner as it did in the other Services. The nucleus of trained personnel around which new units were built had to come from existing manpower inventory. This buildup required the qualitative drawdown of trained personnel from the 2d Marine Division. In addition, the 1st Marine Division, which was manned at less than T/O strength, required rapid augmentation at the expense of other CONUS units.

(c) In 1965, personnel buildup of units in South Vietnam initially caused shortages in both the 3d FSR and 3d Service Battalion on Okinawa. Under the circumstances existing at the time, the 3d Service Battalion furnished such personnel as it could, and personnel deficiencies in the BLSG/LSG were filled as best they could be by the 3d FSR. On 1 June 1966 the FLC had 60 percent of its officer and 79 percent of its authorized strength, and by 30 June 1966 the FLC was at 90 percent strength.<sup>44</sup> As additional personnel were made available to FMFPAC, actual FLC strength increased to full provisional T/O, where it was maintained.

(d) The drive to meet and sustain Marine Corps manpower requirements in SE Asia called for an immediate expansion of training facilities and training personnel to handle the increased recruit input. Infantry combat training and various new and expanded requirements, both for trainers and for individuals in the student/trainee line, impacted on the CONUS FMF.

(e) Expansion of manpower requirements at Marine Corps bases and support facilities providing training, staging, and logistical support for SE Asia prompted a drawdown on tenant activities through increased FMF assistance. Many FMF assistance billets are of essential nature, such as instructor billets at infantry training regiments at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In these cases, the incumbent should not be disengaged for deployment with his parent unit.

<sup>43</sup>U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, FY 67 Military Posture of the United States Navy, Statement by Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations.

<sup>44</sup>Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Historical Summary, March 1965-September 1967 (U), Volume I, p. III-71, (SECRET).



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(f) The impact of drawdown from other areas is expressed in the Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense, 24 August 1968, which states:

"in meeting its Vietnam requirements...the Marine Corps has had to institute a heavy drawdown from other areas of personnel skills and certain items of critical equipment, especially aviation...Marine Corps units in Hawaii and the West Coast can be maintained only at marginal readiness. This condition extends also to the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic where battalion landing teams are below strength in rifle companies."<sup>45</sup>

The report concludes that evidence points alarmingly to the deficiencies in combat readiness of most of our forces where substantial amounts of their equipment and skilled personnel have pulled away to meet the more pressing requirements in Vietnam.

### 5. SERVICE SUMMARIES

#### a. Army

(1) Army contingency planning included the use of the Reserve components and limited extensions of terms of service. Within 24 months following the President's decisions, the Active Army had increased its military strength approximately 475,000 without calling up Reserve component units or individuals, without extending terms of service, and without extending overseas tour lengths in undesirable areas. The planned use of Reserve component elements had particular application with respect to logistical support for combat forces committed to an active theater.

(2) The necessity for enlarging its commitment of personnel to SE Asia, without calling up Reserves, impacted on Army resources worldwide. Manpower ceilings were generally adequate to accomplish assigned missions but some difficulty was experienced in increasing space authorizations, which normally lagged behind requirements. Factors complicating personnel planning included frequent changes of type and detailed organization of units requested for deployment to Vietnam. Decisions on end strengths, composition of the total force structure, and deployment programs were not timely.

(3) During the Vietnam era, the Active Army relied primarily on the Selective Service System to expand and sustain its military strength. It requires approximately 7 months to augment the operational enlisted strength of the Active Army by training, processing, and assigning new recruits. From 30 June 1965 to 30 June 1967, a total of 1,057,000 personnel were brought into the Army. During the same period, net losses totaled 584,500 and operating strength in South Vietnam was increased from approximately 22,500 to 273,000 men.

(4) Retention of both officers and enlisted men has been a continuing problem, the effects of which are accentuated during hostilities. Inadequate retention levels since the Korean War have contributed to the present shortages in the middle grades of officers and enlisted men.

(5) A primary constraint on the rate at which new accessions could be brought on duty was the availability of experienced personnel with the proper skills to expand the training base. Not only was the Army faced with the requirement for providing training in hundreds of thousands of entry-level skills, but heavy demand for personnel made essential additional training in lieu of skill progression normally acquired by on-the-job experience. In late 1965 and early 1966 a unit recruit training mission was assigned to the STRAF. This extensive unit recruit training mission seriously degraded the overall readiness of STRAF to discharge its primary mission of maintaining combat readiness to meet contingency operations.

<sup>45</sup>U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Review of the Vietnam Conflict and Its Impact on U. S. Military Commitments Abroad, Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, 90th Congress, 2d Session, 24 August 1969.

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(6) The strengths of Army units in Europe and Korea were materially reduced to provide skilled personnel for Vietnam, the training base, and the activation of new units.

(7) In combination, the rapid deployment of forces to Vietnam, the policy of a 1-year tour in Vietnam or a 13-month tour in Korea, and no involuntary second tours in either of these areas in less than 25 months created a high level of personnel turbulence. Tour length policies and the worldwide distribution of structure spaces have caused an enlisted skill imbalance between short-tour areas and the rotation base. For certain skills (e.g., helicopter mechanics, electronics maintenance, supply career groups) the preponderance of structure spaces is in short-tour areas. As a result of this imbalance, the rotation base often contains insufficient spaces to which an overseas returnee may be assigned. In some cases, military personnel must be assigned to vacancies without regard to the individual's primary skill, re-trained in another military occupational specialty, or declared surplus to the unit's authorization.

(8) Under current DOD policy, many logistical tasks that are performed by military personnel overseas are performed by civilians in CONUS. This reduces the requirement for military spaces in CONUS but also limits the effectiveness of the CONUS rotation base. The dearth of military spaces in CONUS logistical activities seriously restricts the number of military personnel who can obtain specialized experience in depot operation, maintenance, and supply management. Similarly, when such personnel are returned to CONUS, they often must be assigned to spaces unconnected with their specialties. To cope with logistical skill shortages in Vietnam, on-the-job training was emphasized utilizing the assistance of skilled temporary duty personnel from other commands, civilian technicians, and contract personnel.

### b. Navy

(1) During the buildup of military personnel in South Vietnam between January 1965 and mid-1969, requirements for additional Navy officers and enlisted personnel often developed on short notice. These requirements, when generated in piecemeal fashion from assignment or assumption of new and/or expanding tasks, sometimes could not be met immediately with available personnel. Minimum advance notice of requirements did not always produce crash activation of the Navy personnel system. Delays in arrival of personnel were sometimes occasioned by the necessity for obtaining revision in the overall in-country Navy manpower ceiling established by the Secretary of Defense, and/or the necessity to justify requested augmentation by billet description and workload to Navy manpower planners. Despite these delays and temporary shortfalls, there is little documentary evidence indicating that the performance of logistical tasks or missions assigned to the Navy was at any time seriously jeopardized. Admittedly, periodic personnel shortages reduced efficiency, required assumption of heavily increased workloads, and delayed release of Marine Corps shore parties at Da Nang and Chu Lai until adequate personnel could be provided.

(2) CINCPACFLT and CHNAVPERS assigned a priority providing for 100 percent quantitative and the maximum feasible qualitative filling of approved billets for Navy officer and enlisted men. The decision not to call up the Reserve force eliminated as a resource over half a million trained and organized officers and men, except as some few thousands voluntarily returned to active duty. Manpower requirements were met by procurement and training of additional officers and men as authorized under a gradual, incremental increase in the Navy fiscal-year end strength of approximately 8,500 officer and 93,000 enlisted spaces between 1965 and 1969; by heavy drawdowns on the active fleets outside of SE Asian waters; and by retention on active duty of Regular personnel beyond the end of obligated service. Navy activities providing logistic support to combat forces in South Vietnam were heavily augmented by direct hire of civilian personnel, U.S., indigenous, and TCNs, and supplemented these capabilities by contracting for services and construction.

(3) By 1968 the in-country requirement for Navy officers and men, each of whom had to be rotated annually, peaked at over 38,000. The effect of the corporate body of policies adopted to govern the assignment of Navy personnel to South Vietnam activities was to gradually restrict the available supply of trained and skilled officers and men. Principal among these policies were the mandatory use of volunteers prior to involuntary assignment; the 1-year

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in-country tour, with no involuntary re-exposure for 3 years following tour completion; preferential duty assignment upon tour completion; and optional release to inactive duty up to 180 days prior to completion of obligated service on return to CONUS. In addition to the restrictions placed on available manpower resources by these policies, the decrease in reenlistment rates of first-term and career enlisted personnel deprived the Service of much experienced manpower. The large input of untrained men diluted the residual force and overtaxed training capacities.

(4) For the most part, the priority assigned to South Vietnam activities shielded them from the major impact of skill, experience, and quantity shortages. The principal impact fell upon LANTFLT and PACFLT units outside of SE Asian waters. Rapid exhaustion of volunteer pools resulted in repeated calls with resultant drawdown on active ships. High personnel turbulence and loss of trained personnel seriously reduced the operational capability of ships affected and has had increasingly serious long-range implications for materiel maintenance and readiness. Numbers of ships were placed in reduced readiness because of personnel shortages.

(5) The civilianization of nearly 27,000 Navy officer and enlisted billets under a Secretary of Defense program commencing in 1965 and running through 1968 resulted in the loss of some flexibility in maintaining the desired sea/shore rotation base. Undoubtedly, it also reduced the training base for producing officers with middle management skills and experience in inventory control, petroleum, transportation, etc. However, the impact of shortages thus produced in specialty areas has not been registered sufficiently to be identified in substantiating documentation. Shortages in these fields did, however, make themselves felt from time to time in Navy activities in South Vietnam.

(6) Like the other Services, the Navy made extensive use of civilian hire and contracts for services to supplement and assist military personnel in providing operational logistics support in South Vietnam. With several notable exceptions when enemy operations or wage and hour disputes temporarily affected use of civilian labor, interruptions in such services were brief, and this extensive use of U.S., third-country, indigenous, and contract assistance was effective. In many activities, a nucleus of Navy personnel had been provided to insure continuity of vital operations during periods of interruption.

### c. Air Force

(1) Prior to the summer of 1965, when SE Asia operations sharply increased, total USAF manpower had been decreasing as a result of previous decisions and actions. Thereafter, the trend was reversed and the Air Force undertook to enlarge its base as quickly as possible. All military activities, not just those associated with combat, rapidly expanded. As requirements outpaced available trained manpower, shortages in various skills became acute. By the end of 1965 shortages existed in trained fighter and transport pilots; instructors for combat crew and undergraduate pilot training; aircraft mechanics; conventional munitions handlers and loaders; radio, radar, and photographic specialists; instructors in technical schools and high-level supervisors to give on-the-job training to recently graduated technicians and other partially skilled airmen. The priority assigned to SE Asia activities resulted in spreading these shortages throughout the Air Force, with a concomitant adverse affect on units in the United States and Europe. CONUS units and, to some extent, all units not in SE Asia became little more than service organizations. This situation persisted throughout 1965 and most of 1966 as the Air Force responded to the sudden acceleration of activity in SE Asia. By 1967 the Air Force had adjusted to the situation, and the essential sustaining base of SE Asia was well established. This required tight management control and husbandry of manpower resources to ensure continued ability to meet commitments in SE Asia.

(2) The Air Force has not been retaining the desired numbers of skilled and experienced logistics personnel to meet its enlisted career force objectives. Logistics officer retention is also below desired rates. From the standpoint of total numbers, the procurement/retention system is in balance. The Air Force is able to procure and retain sufficient numbers to meet its annual end-strength objectives; however, the loss of skill and experience, particularly in the logistics area, is a continuing cause for concern.

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(3) The Air Force has strictly adhered to the established policy of a 1-year combat tour of duty in SE Asia. In addition, it has made a concerted effort to preclude involuntary second tours. Between 1 January 1965 and 30 June 1969, 280,467 airmen completed combat tours in SE Asia, of which only 1,143 or less than 0.5 percent were involuntary second tours. No officer has ever served an involuntary second tour in SE Asia.

(4) The decision not to call up the Reserve forces had a negligible affect upon the ability of the Air Force to accomplish its mission in SE Asia.

(5) Nearly 36,000 military spaces were civilianized under the MILX FIX program directed by the Secretary of Defense. This adversely affected the Air Force military personnel rotational base, and substantially decreased the capability to provide military personnel experienced in aerial port and terminal operations.

### d. Marine Corps

(1) The task organization of the FMF provided flexibility in the logistic support of combat operations in South Vietnam. The necessary building blocks were readily at hand for quickly structuring a separate FLC to meet the expanding logistic needs of the II Marine Amphibious Force. As the buildup of Marine Corps total strength progressed from 190,213 in 1965 to 309,771 in 1969, the personnel management system promptly adjusted to accommodate the requirement.

(2) During the first 2 years of the Vietnam conflict, the major manpower effort was devoted to building up the total strength as rapidly as possible so that the large forces required in WESTPAC could be deployed. Without authority to call up Reserve units, this was accomplished by extensive recruiting and training of new accessions. Meeting Vietnam requirements also occasioned heavy drawdowns on FMF and non-FMF units. Extensive management action, such as military occupational specialty and rank substitution, was required to sustain WESTPAC forces.

(3) Reserve force callup would have decreased the personnel turbulence encountered and would have facilitated manpower management. Nevertheless, Marine Corps personnel programming action was responsive to the manpower needs in WESTPAC, but the drawdown on forces outside of SE Asia was detrimental to their operational readiness.

(4) The overseas deployment of one-third of the Active Marine Corps, the declining retention rate of junior officers and hard skill enlisted personnel, together with the 13-month tour policy in South Vietnam with no involuntary second tour in less than 24 months, and the early release program contributed to the high level of personnel turbulence and required extensive manpower management.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### a. Conclusions

(1) In general, overall Service and in-country military personnel ceilings were adequate during the Vietnam era and authorized increases were numerically responsive to mission and task assignments. However, authorized ceiling increases lagged behind requirements for personnel generated by field activities. By the time these requirements were acted upon by reviewing authorities, shortfalls created significant problems in providing logistic support to combat forces in South Vietnam (paragraph 1 and 2a).

(2) Prior to and during the buildup of forces in South Vietnam, substantial numbers of trained personnel and organized combat support and combat service support units existed in the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. Use of these units and personnel could have substantially assisted in meeting urgent and short-notice requirements generated by the rapid expansion of the logistic support base in South Vietnam (paragraph 3a, b, c, and d).

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(3) The impact of the decision not to call Reserve forces to active duty deprived in varying degrees the Services of a reservoir of trained and skilled manpower that could have been used to reduce the response time in meeting requirements for logistic support personnel in South Vietnam; to augment the continental United States training and rotation base; and to cushion the degradation in worldwide military capability, which resulted from extensive draw-downs of military personnel and units from other activities to meet South Vietnam requirements (paragraphs 3a, b, c, d, and 4c).

(4) When the decision not to call up Reserve forces effectively eliminated that source of trained personnel, compensatory manpower increases did not provide adequate lead time for the Services to plan for, procure, and train logistical personnel in a number of skill categories to permit prompt and adequate response to rapidly expanding requirements in South Vietnam. This situation was aggravated by the necessity for maintaining a balance between Vietnam and non-Vietnam requirements for logistical personnel in short skill categories (paragraphs 3a, b, c, d, and 4).

(b) The priority accorded by all Services to meeting requirements of South Vietnam activities for logistical personnel under policies of 100 percent quantitative manning and the highest feasible qualitative manning was effective in eventually providing adequate military manpower to meet military mission requirements, and operated to limit the impact of Service-wide skill shortages in Vietnam activities. However, shortfalls often occurred as requirements expanded more rapidly than military personnel could be provided. These shortfalls during the buildup period had an adverse effect on the provision of fully effective logistic support, and on the economy of that support, although they were insufficient to jeopardize seriously mission accomplishment (see also Chapter IV, Volume II) (paragraphs 2a and 4).

(6) As the conflict lengthened and the requirement for military manpower in South Vietnam steadily increased, the cumulative effect of personnel policies was to reduce the availability of skilled and experienced officers and enlisted men. The application of these restrictive policies, although unquestionably beneficial to military morale, contributed to the in-country shortages from time to time when coupled with rapidly developing new requirements, time lags in the authorization of personnel increases, and the effort to maintain at least minimum capabilities in military units outside SE Asia. Another contributory factor was the steady decline in the retention rate of officer and enlisted personnel (paragraph 3b).

(7) The civilianization policies initiated by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 were detrimental to logistical personnel readiness when requirements arose for a training and rotation base for SE Asia.

(a) The Army, which had converted a large number of logistic military positions to civilian in the continental United States, was adversely affected in its capability to support military requirements.

(b) The principal effect of the Civilianization Program within the Naval Establishment was to reduce the sea/shore rotation base through elimination of billets in shore activities available for assignment of military personnel.

(c) As a result of civilianization of continental United States billets in the Air Force aerial port/air terminal complexes, the available training and rotational base was insufficient to sustain the unprecedented requirements for trained military personnel generated by the buildup in SE Asia.

(d) No major adverse effect upon the Marine Corps logistical personnel or training base has been identified as resulting from the Civilianization Program (paragraph 3c).

(8) All Services met SE Asia requirements for logistical personnel by a combination of assigning of organized military units and individual military personnel and hiring civilians and contract personnel for services. During the buildup of military forces in South Vietnam the extensive use of civilians and contract personnel for logistical services, particularly

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in construction and unskilled labor fields, was an essential concomitant of that buildup and contributed substantially to the rapidity with which it was accomplished (paragraph 4).

(9) All Services were forced to make heavy drawdowns on military activities outside SE Asia in order to meet requirements for logistical personnel, combat support, and combat service support units in that area. In some cases, these drawdowns resulted in serious and continuing degradation in the military effectiveness of activities involved (paragraph 4c and e).

(10) Factors that led to the extensive use of civilian personnel in logistical roles and contracting for logistical services in South Vietnam include the following:

a. Shortages in readily available military personnel and organized units for use in providing required logistical support during the early stages of buildup.

b. The nature of counterinsurgency operations, which required establishment of military enclaves throughout South Vietnam. Because of the insecurity of land lines of communications, these enclaves had to be provided with a degree of logistical self-support not normally required when dependence can be placed on centralized sources. This dispersal increased requirements for military and civilian personnel to perform logistical tasks.

c. The large number of military personnel that would have been required to provide and maintain the broad logistical support base essential to conduct of counterinsurgency operations if civilian resources had not been used.

d. The existence of high-level policies that encouraged and sometimes required use of civilians as a substitute for military personnel in logistical support roles in order to permit increasing number of combat troops under established in-country ceilings (paragraphs 4d and e).

(11) The extensive use of civilians and contract services under the conditions and circumstances prevailing in South Vietnam during the buildup was sound and necessary. However, the degree to which civilians can be substituted for military personnel in providing logistic support for military operations depends in large degree upon the security of installations and geographic locations and the availability of qualified civilian resources (paragraph 4d).

b. Recommendations. The Board recommends that:

(MP-1) Contingency planning include alternatives that provide efficient logistical manpower resources in the event that Reserve forces are not mobilized (conclusions (2), (3), and (4)).

(MP-2) The Services review selected current and proposed contingency plans and evaluate the supportive personnel policies to ensure that an adequate training and rotational base by skill category is provided. (conclusions 5, 6, and 7).

(MP-3) The Services develop and initiate plans and policies for restructuring the Active Forces to the extent necessary to provide the highly specialized, long-lead-time logistical personnel to meet requirements imposed by contingency plans (conclusions (7), (8), (9), and (10)).

(MP-4) The Department of the Army review and establish the number of spaces in the Active Forces required to maintain an adequate logistical manpower rotation base, retaining a balanced military/civilian ratio that is responsive to contingency operations with or without mobilization (conclusion (7)).

(MP-5) The Department of the Air Force review the aerial port/air terminal system of the Military Airlift Command to determine and establish as necessary, the number of spaces in the Active Forces required in CONUS aerial port/air terminal manpower authorizations to provide a training and rotational base adequate to anticipated contingency requirements (conclusion (7)).

**CHAPTER III**  
**GENERATION OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS,**  
**THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS**



## CHAPTER III

# GENERATION OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS, THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### a. Background

(1) The dominant objective of the United States in South Vietnam has been to provide an environment within which the South Vietnamese could attain political maturity and stability, social and economic viability, and build an indigenous military force adequate to the preservation of the country as a national entity. As the United States became more deeply involved in the affairs of South Vietnam, and as ways and means were sought to attain this objective, it became more apparent to planners that an American presence would be required in almost every aspect of civilian and military life. In many areas of national life where governmental functioning was required, the general situation was one of disorder and disarray. It is probable that realization of the complexity of the overall situation and an increasing awareness of the interreaction between military and civilian programs gave considerable impetus to development by the Secretary of Defense of a detailed process for national-level management of the military aspects of the war in Vietnam. The military effort of the United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in SE Asia was to provide the shield for the process of nation-building.

(2) The Secretary of Defense had controlled deployments to South Vietnam since 1 January 1964 on a case-by-case basis; but with the burgeoning manpower requirements of the spring and summer of 1965, attention was directed to formalizing an overall system for control of deployments to SE Asia. Thereafter, the process developed rapidly and became more definitive with each successive request for major forces. The system was activated by the generation of a force requirement.

#### b. Development of the Program Deployment Plan System

(1) The Secretary of Defense was given the central authority for the generation of military force requirements under the guidance and direction of the President. The principal agent of the Secretary of Defense was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (ASD(SA)). The primary instrument through which control was exercised was the Deployment Program initiated by the Secretary of Defense to place ceilings on total military manpower strengths in South Vietnam and Thailand. This program evolved into a major control mechanism, expanded gradually to cover not only military manpower ceilings by Service, but also program objectives and project goals, some of which were only indirectly related to the military effort. Eventually, limitations were placed on the number of certain military units such as construction battalions (CBs), combat and support aircraft and helicopters; on artillery by caliber and number of pieces; and on total numbers of combat and support ships, patrol and auxiliary craft. Troop ceilings were imposed in the interest of controlling plaster expenditures, based upon an annual figure computed at the maximum permissible in the fight to hold the line against inflation of the Vietnamese economy. Project goals were established for such major programs as conversion of military spaces to civilian.

(2) Program Deployment Plans were expanded by periodic changes and updating. Their applicability was extended from South Vietnam and Thailand to peripheral countries in SE Asia. Ultimately, similar programs were developed for Korea, Japan, the Philippines,



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Guam, and the Ryukyus, although not in the same detail. Compliance with approved force levels was monitored by a complex reporting system. The objective of the entire review and approval process was to insert force requirements into the current approved Deployment Program issued by the Secretary of Defense. Once forces were approved it became the responsibility of the Service concerned to select and ready individual units for deployment. Actual deployments were directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff against a schedule approved in the Program Deployment Plan. The Program Deployment Plan system had an evolutionary development. The Secretary of Defense began closely controlling deployments to South Vietnam about 1 January 1964.<sup>1</sup> Stringent rules for such control were not devised or enforced until April 1965. The Services had to resubstantiate all in-country forces prior to that date. Subsequent to that date, every major deployment proposed by a Service, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has required extensive justification. The approved Program Deployment Plan became the basis for Service manpower, logistical, and budget planning.<sup>2</sup>

c. Chapter Organization. The remaining paragraphs and Appendixes A and B of this chapter describe the Program Deployment Plan system in proper context and perspective. Appendix A is a historical narrative that describes the generation of military requirements by Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), CINCPAC, the Services, and other commands and activities, against the background of the buildup of forces in SE Asia. Appendix B provides 6 of the 20 Program #5 tables as an example of the operative document for approval of requested forces. Within the body of this chapter, the successive Program Deployment Plans are set out chronologically in order to show their progressive development and relationship. Translation of approved programs into personnel actions by Service personnel organizations is touched upon. The chapter briefly describes the elaborate accounting procedures, as well as the method developed for making minor changes and adjustments in the current Program Plan.

## 2. GENERATION OF REQUIREMENTS

a. No new or unusual methods were developed for the generation of force requirements during the Vietnam era. In simplest terms, a requirement generated from an evaluated judgment that a need existed for a certain capability to carry out a particular task. Requirements were generated by all commands, at all levels, from field commanders up to and including the Secretary of Defense himself. They varied from a need for single individuals with special qualifications or skills to major military units. The process was the same whether the initial request was for combat forces, a construction battalion (CB), or an aircraft squadron. Major force requirements were derived from the tactics to be used in pursuing stated strategies. At conferences in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington, the senior military commanders often expressed requirements for additional military personnel in gross numbers. Similarly, the President or Secretary of Defense announced major force commitments only in general terms and round numbers. The detailed studies of requirements were made at staff level, both in the military departments and OSD. Major force requirements were submitted by CINCPAC in massive compilations called force requirements packages.

b. A typical force requirements package leaving CINCPAC Headquarters for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of hundreds of pages and several volumes. The document presented a statement of the CINCPAC concept of operations for the war in SE Asia; a summary of the intelligence background; an overview of the threat as it existed and was projected to develop; and explicit details of the strategy and tactics contemplated in the time frame covered by the particular requirements package being forwarded. These details included the specific time of the deployment and the geographic location to which the deploying unit should move; construction and logistic support that was required to manage the additive

<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, United States Navy. Memorandums. OP10C to LP10. subject: Status of Navy Portion of Program #4 Deployment Plan for Southeast Asia (U). 12 May 1967 (SECRET).

<sup>2</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum. subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #3, revised through Change #9 (U). 1 August 1966 (TOP SECRET).

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forces; and transportation arrangements, port throughput capability, and implications of the deployments for such other programs as the control of in-country inflation. Manpower and units required were broken down by Service. An identifying force requirement number (FRN) was added to each unit or homogeneous grouping. Force requirements packages sometimes were tailored to match guidance from higher authority as to available resources from which requirements might be drawn. In such cases the requirements package might contain a number of alternatives or options, together with an explanation of the impact of each on the basic strategy or concept of operations.

c. Requirements of joint activities originating in the field were processed through the joint chain of command from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC and were submitted by him, with his comments and recommendations, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They, in turn, submitted the approved package, with their recommendations, to the Secretary of Defense. Final decisions on major requirements were made by the Secretary or, in some cases, the President.

d. Paralleling the development and processing of major force requirements was the usual flow of minor requirements, involving revisions in deployment timing, changes in force mixes or composition of units, augmentations of existing activities, etc. When these involved a single Service, were within the established ceiling, and were inconsequential from a joint standpoint, they often were processed in Service channels. However, many single-Service requirements found their way through Service channels to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and even to the Secretary of Defense before a final decision was made. All force requirements eventually were reflected in the approved Deployment Program or effected within the Service ceiling prescribed in that document.

e. Usually force requirements were generated in the field; however, sometimes a requirement developed to support a program sponsored in Washington, particularly in the research and development community. Implementation of one decision generated a major requirement for additional ground troops, combat and combat supported aircraft, CBs, new headquarters groups and augmentation of existing military organizations. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC developed the specific requirements at the Secretary's direction.

### 3. REVIEW AND APPROVAL

a. Force requirements, once inserted into the proper channels, automatically activated the review and approval process at each successive level of command. Requirements were studied and forwarded with recommendations or modifications, or they were denied. When a request from COMUSMACV involved major force increases, initial review was conducted at CINCPAC Headquarters. This review normally occasioned a major conference with representatives of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the component commands, the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, the Commander of the U.S. Military Advisory Command in Thailand, the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet, the Commander of the Seventh Air Force, the Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam, and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Service representatives would provide information on the availability of forces. When scheduling could not be met or units requested were unavailable, the requests for specific units would be revised to ensure an integrated combat/combat support/combat service support package. The whole would be keyed to essential construction, transportation, and readiness of the areas to which new forces were scheduled to deploy. These conferences studied implications of variations in force mix, modifications in time schedules, nonavailability of various specified units, requirements for additional construction and transportation, and the impact of troop levels upon plaster expenditures. CINCPAC developed and inserted additional forces required by other subordinate Pacific Commands. When approved by CINCPAC, these massive submissions were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where they were again subjected to exhaustive review. The Services were provided with an opportunity to study and comment upon these requirements and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their capability to meet them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the impact of meeting CINCPAC's requirements on other worldwide commitments, general

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readiness, and residual capability to respond to other contingency plans. Recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. In OSD initial review and analysis was normally handled by ASD(SA). Alternatives, tradeoffs, cost effectiveness, justification, and the interrelationship of military requirements and objectives with other on-going programs received careful attention. The Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the senior field commanders were often directed to examine alternatives proposed by ASD(SA), or to provide additional justification for forces requested. ASD(SA) spearheaded these force requirement reviews; however, the Secretary of Defense, his deputy, and other Assistant Secretaries of Defense were brought into the process to examine and comment upon programs and requirements. Much of this was done informally and without documentation.

c. The development and study of options for consideration required a considerable amount of time and effort. There were lengthy interchanges of information between all concerned. On numerous occasions detailed study of options by COMUSMACV was required to statistically document stated requirements. The dominant consideration in justifying force deployments was the ability to quantify results to be achieved as against those to be attained by other means. Unquantifiable judgment factors therefore tended to be neglected. A considerable time lapse was experienced during the earlier phases of the buildup between the time that CINCPAC forwarded the MACV requirement to Washington and the date of its approval. A random sampling of such requests and their approvals is summarized in Table 23.

TABLE 23

### MACV PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

<u>Personnel Requirement</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Approval Action</u>
MACV Joint Tables of Distribution increase of 1 Navy Flag Officer and 1 AF Gen Officer	CINCPAC Msg 100046Z April 1965	Navy Flag Officers approved 3 May 65: action deferred on AF Gen Off, then approved on 14 May (JCS Msg 2159/14 May 65)
26 Spaces for MACV Directorate (Political Warfare Advisory)	CINCPAC Msg 152043Z May 1965	Approved 5 August 1965 (JCS Msg 7524/5 Aug 65)
105 Spaces for Navy Advisory Group, USMACV	CINCPAC Msg 012359Z June 1965	Approved 12 August 1965 (JCS Msg 8103/12 Aug 65)
7 Spaces for Navy Advisory Group, USMACV	CINCPAC Msg 260426Z June 1965	Approved 18 August 1965 (JCS Msg 8533/18 Aug 65)
151 Spaces for Army and Air Force Exchange Service Opns	CINCPAC Msg 240207Z July 1965	Approved 97 spaces on 20 Aug 65 (JCS Msg 8796/20 Aug 65)
7 Spaces for Combined Planning Staff, USMACV	CINCPAC Msg 290005Z May 1965	Approved 8 Sep 65 (JCS Msg 1128/8 Sep 65)
18 Spaces for Historical and Admin Personnel	CINCPAC Msg 290223Z August 1965	Approved 11 Oct 65 (JCS Msg 3751/11 Oct 65)

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d. OSD review resulted in a decision, approving, approving with modifications, or disapproving requested forces. Secretarial action on major force requests was issued in the form of a Program Deployment Plan. This plan was a set of tables forwarded by a Secretary of Defense Memorandum. Between major revisions of this document, changes were effected by issuance of Program Change Decisions. Appendix B is a partial set of deployment tables of Program #5. The tables and program change decisions provided a plan under which the Services were to prepare units for deployment, to budget, and to develop manpower and logistics plans. The indicated time schedule was to be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in issuing deployment directives to the Services or Joint Commands responsible for meeting the requirements stated.

### 4. SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS: DEVELOPMENT AND SEQUENCE

a. In order to gain insight into development of this master plan for control of military force levels in SE Asia, the following paragraphs trace the evolution from program to program and highlight major policy changes and innovations. This chapter discusses Programs #1 through #8. In clarification, Programs #1 and #2 were not issued with numerical designations. Programs #1 and #2 were originally referred to as Phase I and Phase II deployments, respectively. Phase II was modified shortly after approval, and programs known as Phase IIA and Phase IIR were adopted in late 1965 and early 1966, to be superseded by Program #3.

b. On 17 February 1966, the Secretary of Defense sent a Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he provided a set of tables for force deployments.<sup>3</sup> Line 1 of this table was an 11 December 1965 deployment plan that had been previously approved. Line 2 outlined CINCPAC's requirements submitted on 15 February 1966 under a number of assumptions varying for each of three cases as to sources that might be available to meet these requirements (see Appendix A). Line 3 listed Case I requirements. Case I was the optimum combination of options and maximum requirements. The Secretary stated that the Services should assume that all the requirements of Case I would be met and directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study all ways of meeting it, short of calling up the Reserve forces or extending terms of service. He further directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for deployment of forces on the schedule outlined and to use ingenuity to devise substitutes where units were unavailable. Use of civilian personnel was directed in place of military personnel, to the extent possible. Line 4 of this table indicated the estimates provided by the Services as to their capability to meet Case I requirements if there were no Reserve callup or extension of terms of service.

c. After study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations,<sup>4</sup> the Secretary forwarded a preliminary planning directive to the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He announced that he had reviewed the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and related memorandums of the Service Secretaries of 3 and 4 March 1966, and that all required more study and review. However, until such study was completed he directed the deployment of forces to South Vietnam in accordance with Case I deployment capability lines of the tables attached to his memorandum.<sup>5</sup> The memorandum stated that, until further notice, these lines were to be considered as the revised, approved deployment plan for South Vietnam. All necessary actions were to be taken to meet deployment dates without callup of Reserves or extensions of terms of service (except for the Marine Corps and the Navy). Troop movements from Europe had to receive prior written approval of the Secretary or his deputy. Where delays had already occurred, the Secretary directed that they should be made up as rapidly as feasible. The memorandum also stated that, if changes to these plans should prove necessary, a deployment change proposal should be submitted for his approval. In addition, two documents were to be kept constantly available and updated weekly. The first was a set of tables in the format of his 17 February 1966 memorandum, showing the 11 December 1965 plan, the currently approved Plan (Case I

<sup>3</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Planning Assumptions (U), 17 February 1966 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>4</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum JCSM/30-66, subject: (SECRET), 1 March 1966 (SECRET).

<sup>5</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, JCS (U), 10 March 1966 (TOP SECRET).

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as amended), and the actual and projected deployments. The second document was a detailed troop list, for the current and three subsequent months, of units that should be deployed in keeping with the approved plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned responsibility for keeping this information current. To the SE Asia Programs Division of OASD (SA) the Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility for specifying formats, monitoring data, determining reasons for delay and necessary expediting action. The tables in this memorandum showed the December Plan, by month, from July 1966 through June 1967; the Case I Capability; the Service Capability; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendations. These last three were broken out by Service: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Footnoted in these tables were explanations that the December Plan related to the FY 66 SE Asia Supplemental Appropriations Request; Case I was the Service Capability estimate as of 6 February 1966; Service Capability is the Services' estimates of 3-4 March 1966 to meet CINCPAC's requirements, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendations are those of JCSM 130-66.

d. Having been assigned monitorship of SE Asia Deployment Programs, ASD (SA) advised the Secretaries of the military departments by memorandum of 10 February 1966 that he had established within his office a SE Asia Program Team.<sup>6</sup> Each Service Secretary was directed to establish a counterpart team, "responsible for knowing everything concerning its own Service relevant to our military posture in SE Asia."<sup>7</sup> He advised that his team would probably consist of persons working on land forces, logistics, construction, manpower, tactical air forces, and an intelligence generalist (specializing in force effectiveness). The memorandum stated: "The purpose of this Group is to devise additional tables concerning the SE Asia deployments through Phase IIA Revised, with all related information as to logistics, construction, production, capacities, aircraft, base beddowns, attrition rates, etc."<sup>8</sup> Shortly, he continued, he would develop automated information on forces, consumption, production, and their interrelationships. The team would also have the responsibility for establishing standard procedures for reviews and approval of all proposed changes to the approved deployment assumptions for planning.

e. Each of the Services took immediate action to meet the requirements thus imposed. The Army established a Force Planning and Analysis Office in the Office of the Chief of Staff. The mission of this organization was to improve direction and management at top Army levels and to provide a closer link with comparable agencies in OSD. Similarly, working closely with the Office of ASD (SA), it was charged with integration of Army requirements for force structure, manpower, materials, and readiness. On 17 February 1967, the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff was created and charged with the mission of developing a management system that would ensure positive control of Army resources at all levels. One of the three directorates within the office, the Directorate of Force Planning Analysis, works for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to analyze staff output on manning levels, force problems, capability studies, and related logistical matters.

f. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established a SE Asia Programming Office (SEAPRO Navy). The CNO directive establishing this office charged it to have ready information on any request; the ready reference information received; the action assigned by CNO, OSD, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the anticipated arrival, delivery, or completed action date; the source of funding, and if processed as a special priority item; plus any additional pertinent information.<sup>9</sup> All current programs were to be assigned sponsors who were required to make daily status reports. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) (DCNO (P&P)) acted as coordinating agent for force requirements packages.

<sup>6</sup> Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Service Departments, subject: Southeast Asia Program Team (U), 10 February 1966 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Headquarters, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter, Serial 78, P90, subject: Southeast Asia Programming Office (U), 10 February 1966 (SECRET).

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Workings of this organization, in connection with the review, approval, and implementation process, will be described in the following paragraphs below. The Marine Corps and Air Force handled force deployments planning through normal command channels.

g. On 11 April 1966 the Secretary of Defense took action on the recommendations submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM 218-66 dated 4 April 1966. Mr. McNamara approved, with exceptions noted, the deployment plan submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretarial Memorandum<sup>10</sup> further stated that changes to the deployment program were to be submitted on "Adjustment Requests," and referred to the memorandum of 1 April 1966<sup>11</sup> that established the system.

h. The tables enclosed with this 11 April memorandum were titled "April 10 Deployment Plan--SE ASIA." The detail with which deployments were planned can best be seen by reference to follow-on tables that were subsequently promulgated. Appendix B provides a partial set of tables for illustration. The 10 April tables authorized ceiling strengths in South Vietnam and in Thailand, by Service, from July 1965 through June 1967. These ceilings included a figure for offshore Navy forces. Following these ceilings, which were summarized, came a monthly breakdown of total ceiling figures for the number of maneuver battalions for the Army and Marine Corps, broken down into airborne infantry, air mobile, infantry, armed cavalry and tank, and USMC infantry and tank battalions. Engineering battalions were divided into Army, Marine Corps, Republic of Vietnam Army, and FWMAF. Navy mobile construction battalions (NMCBs) were listed separately. Every aircraft authorized to be in-country or deployed was listed by type under headings of either combat or support. Artillery was listed by numbers of guns and each caliber authorized, for the Army, Marine Corps, and the Navy's 8-inch guns (cruisers). Warships were listed as totals authorized by type under combat and service support categories, from cruisers to coastal and river patrol craft.

i. On 15 July 1966 the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum for the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.<sup>12</sup> This memorandum provided revised tables for SE Asia Deployment #3, including changes #1 through #3, and incorporated these changes into the original deployment plan. A memorandum of 1 August 1966 further revised Program #3 with changes through #9, adding the information that this program was to be used for manpower and logistical planning and for financial and budgeting purposes. Also included were approval of transfer of 18 USAF aircraft to the Vietnamese Air Force, to be replaced by an F-4 squadron, and addition of eight C-123 spray aircraft to the USAF in-country strength, and approval of a number of "below threshold" changes made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Below threshold changes were revisions to the plan as originally issued by the Secretary of Defense, involving changes in a force mix, delays or advances in deployment schedules. Below threshold changes had to be within ceiling limitations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided whether an item was above or below threshold. The basis of decision on a particular change or modification was a judgment as to whether it was of sufficient significance to be brought to the attention of the Secretary for decision. In the case of below threshold changes, the Secretary was simply advised of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decision by copy of the approving notification, the original of which was forwarded to the Service that had originated the change request.

j. On 18 November 1966, Southeast Asia Deployment Program #4 was issued providing new tables of authorized ceiling strengths.<sup>13</sup> Significant changes in Program #4 included

<sup>10</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Plan (U), 11 April 1966 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>11</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Adjustment Request System for the Approved Southeast Asia Deployment Plan (U), 1 April 1966 (SECRET).

<sup>12</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #3, including Changes #1 through #3 (U), 15 July 1966 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>13</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #4 (U), 18 November 1966 (TOP SECRET).



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extension of the deployment program through FY 68; a major change in ordnance consumption estimates; the expansion of authorized numbers of combat sorties and estimated aircraft loss rates to reflect OASD (SA)'s "November best estimate"; and an increase in B-52 sorties to 800 per month commencing in February 1967. The revised tables also incorporated a monthly estimate of piaster expenditure rates to reflect the approved budget ceiling of 42 billion piasters for the next fiscal year, a sum just over \$375 million at the then current exchange rate (see Appendix A, paragraph 10).

k. A memorandum from the Secretary of Defense of 10 December 1966 updated Program #4 tables through change #5.<sup>14</sup> Significant changes included tradeoff of certain units; deletion of four Army engineer battalions, one NMCB, and two Army artillery battalions; and substitution of two airborne battalions and a tank battalion for two infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron. Certain modifications were also made to authorized piaster expenditure rates.

l. On 13 February 1967 the Secretary of Defense republished Program #4 tables,<sup>15</sup> incorporating as significant changes approval of the redeployment of four EC-121 aircraft and 116 personnel from South Vietnam to Thailand; redeployment of 25 helicopters and 164 personnel from Thailand to South Vietnam, and the entry of 234 personnel into Okinawa in February 1967. Memorandums of 16 March and 19 April 1967 continued to update Program #4 through Changes #16 and #25, respectively. Some of the items receiving Secretary of Defense approval were delay in the closure dates of several units; deployment of four Army CBs at 80 percent of capability, and the temporary diversion of an NMCB from Okinawa to South Vietnam. Memorandums of 25 May and 5 June 1967 approved forces for a new operation concept; augmented in-country USMC units by some 3,500 personnel in order to maintain them at full effective strength; and authorized substitution of certain units, transfers between countries, and commitment of new forces. The memorandum of 5 June 1967 extended the plan lines of all tables through FY 69, except that aircraft deployment tables were extended to end in CY 70.

m. By memorandum of 14 August 1967 the Secretary of Defense promulgated tables for Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5 (see Appendix B).<sup>16</sup> These tables included forces tentatively approved for deployment by Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 10 August 1967, "Fiscal Year 1968 Force Requirements for South Vietnam (Program #5)." Sorties, aircraft loss rate estimates, and piaster expenditures were revised. Piaster expenditure ceilings were extended to end in CY 67. Program #5 superseded Program #4 through change #39. This new plan established ceilings on temporary additional duty personnel, by Service, and estimates of the monthly progress that should be made in the civilianization program for conversion of military billets to civilian.

n. After the PUEBLO incident temporarily focused attention on Korea, the Secretary of Defense issued a set of deployment tables for that country similar to those governing deployments to SE Asia. These tables, dated 8 February 1968, have been cancelled; however, they continued to govern military deployments to that area until 1969.

o. A Presidential decision to increase force levels in South Vietnam to 549,500 military personnel, together with an extensive civilianization program to reduce support troops, produced SE Asia Deployment Program #6, issued by Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 4 April 1968. SE Asia Deployment Program #7 provided tables reflecting the President's decision to withdraw 25,000 troop personnel from South Vietnam by 31 August 1969. The resulting troop strength approved was 524,500 U.S. military personnel. The redeployments to other areas than the

<sup>14</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #4 through Change #5 (U), 10 December 1966 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>15</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #4 through Change #11 (U), 13 February 1967 (TOP SECRET).

<sup>16</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5 (U), 14 August 1967 (TOP SECRET).

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continental United States (CONUS), such as the USMC redeployments to Okinawa, were reflected in the force levels authorized for these other areas.<sup>17</sup> Program #8 implemented the President's decision to reduce authorized troop strength by 40,500 personnel by 15 December 1969; and a memorandum of 18 November 1969 directed a reduction of 6,000 military personnel in Thailand.

### 5. SERVICE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS

a. Service activities responded to requests from higher authority and implemented approved programs and handling requirements of activities for personnel within approved ceiling figures. Procedures followed in the Department of the Navy are sufficiently typical to be used as an illustration. DCNO (P&P), as coordinating agency for force requirements packages, drew upon other branches of the Office of the CNO (OPNAV) for information, comments, and recommendations. For example, in connection with CINCPAC's Force Requirements submitted after the mid-winter conference in 1965, DCNO (P&P) reviewed the proposed CINCPAC strategy and, with assistance from other branches of OPNAV, studied the manpower requirements, assessed their validity, and considered implications for production, training, budgeting, manpower resources, and logistics requirements. A Navy position was staffed on these matters and forwarded to the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. For each of the major Navy units a sponsor furnished information in the form of position papers that identified the sponsor, the title (SE Asia Requirement), the situation and justification, the pertinent references, the estimated costs for the fiscal year, the personnel military strength involved, and the estimated time required to implement the requirement. Since this particular program required submission of Service Capabilities under each of three cases as to sources that might be drawn upon for necessary personnel, each submission covered these items under each of the cases.

b. The position of the CNO was forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with recommendations on ways and means of meeting CINCPAC's requirements. In a given case these recommendations might include any or all of the following: callup of Reserve forces; involuntary extension of terms of service; reactivation requirements for ships or identified shore activities; required funding; required increases in authorized Service fiscal year-end-strength ceilings to provide a direct pipeline and CONUS rotation and training base to support augmentation; recommendations for industrial mobilization; or a plan to defer certain ship inactivations.

c. Deployment Authorization Tables in the various programs issued by the Secretary of Defense had to be turned into actual deployments by the Services. Selection and readying of units was a Service responsibility. The Services responded to requirements through normal Service personnel organizations with normal staff planning for such matters as training, selection of personnel, transportation, and funding. Issuance of a manpower authorization for a given SE Asia activity usually required coordination and exchanges of information in Service channels to verify and justify requirements for type, grade, and numbers of personnel.

### 6. CHANGING THE APPROVED PROGRAM

a. SE Asia Deployment Programs were not inviolate, nor were they static. Procedures were developed for modification and change as the situation warranted. CINCPAC called a conference early in 1967 to work out rules, regulations, practices, policies, and procedures that would govern the complex problems involved in management of force deployments. Program #4 had established a strength ceiling for South Vietnam that required nomination of approved spaces as tradeoffs for any strength increase, however small, in order to remain within overall ceilings. Restructuring had to be undertaken to accomplish these tradeoffs. The administrative process by which the proposed tradeoff spaces were derived and presented to OSD for approval was time-consuming. Particular difficulty was experienced in identifying trade-off spaces for long-lead-time units that had been newly required. At the time that these units

<sup>17</sup>Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #7 (U), 15 July 1969 (SECRET).



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were requested it was not known what spaces could best be offered up. After extended negotiations between CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, general guidelines were established for control of force levels in SE Asia. COMUSMACV was authorized to plan and program against the approved FY 68 end-strength figure, without concurrent tradeoffs, keeping in mind that the end-strength ceiling must be achieved. Changes to program force levels (increases) would be offset by tradeoffs of an equal number of spaces at the end of each calendar quarter. Proposed personnel actions would be administratively controlled and monitored by use of Deployment Adjustment Requests (DARs), carrying an impact statement of the proposed action on a Military Service Account. A debit/credit ledger would be maintained. Tradeoff spaces could be furnished at any time to maintain a reasonable debit account. By withholding deployment orders of units programmed to deploy during the last few months of FY 68, the Secretary of Defense could ensure that the fiscal year-end-strength ceiling was not exceeded. The approved Debit/Credit Accounting for Program Strengths was to be maintained in the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the following procedures to effect changes to the program:

- (1) Each change in strength would be processed on either a DAR or a Deployment Adjustment Notification (DAN) form.
- (2) Each DAR or DAN processed would reflect the current status of the debit/credit account for the Service concerned and, upon approval, would be distributed to interested commands.
- (3) A monthly recap of debit/credit status would be provided to all concerned.
- (4) CINCPAC would be apprised of the debit/credit status of each Service in sufficient time to permit nomination of tradeoff spaces, if required, to balance the debit account by the end of each calendar quarter.

b. These attempts at resolution of the rules and regulations governing strength accounting and methods for changing deployment programs went through the usual process of refinement and development. In May 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a paper that provided current guidance and procedures for processing and accounting for force requirements, deployments, and redeployments directly related to the conflict in SE Asia.<sup>18</sup> This guidance applies to day-to-day actions, proposing adjustments to existing deployment programs. Major force requirements that might result in a new deployment program follow the channels through CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Basically, current procedures provide for Joint Chiefs of Staff action on all requested changes to the approved deployment program. Although actions will normally be submitted through joint channels, they may be submitted by a Service if they are Service-oriented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff determine whether or not the action is above or below threshold. If below threshold, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the decision action in a DAN; if above threshold, requiring decision by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff publish a DAR and forward it to the Secretary of Defense for decision. All transactions are either add or delete. There is a debit/credit account that may be used for required tradeoffs. The prescribed procedures require detailed identification of units, geographic locations, deployment timing, etc., in order to keep data banks up to date. An approved DAR or DAN that specifies additional deployment of forces is the authorizing document for a Service to ready the unit/units or personnel for deployment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff retain authority to direct the actual movement. CINCPAC is charged with responsibility in the reserve situation, the redeployment of personnel or units from SE Asia. Temporary deployments are handled through Service and component command channels with strict accounting maintained.

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<sup>18</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum MJCS 268-69, subject: Force Requirements, Deployments and Redeployments Related to Southeast Asia and Korea (U), 23 May 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL).

## 7. MONITORING THE PROGRAMS

a. The Secretary of Defense had delegated to ASD (SA) the authority to monitor compliance with the tables of the various SE Asia Deployment Programs. This required development of extensive and detailed accounting procedures, many of which were eventually automated. The basic message report provided strength figures on a weekly basis to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MACV Directive 335-14 of 20 April 1967 required in-country commands to submit weekly and monthly reports of strength information to be used for planning, programming, and support of missions assigned to COMUSMACV. This directive produced accounting data permitting COMUSMACV to respond to requirements of higher authority for strength reporting. Accounting covered both permanent change of station personnel and temporary duty (TDY) personnel. Complicated agreements were worked out between the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV in order to identify categories of personnel who would be counted for specific purposes. For example, personnel on R&R and in hospitals were not counted for purposes of piaster expenditure ceilings. Army personnel in transit in and out of the country were counted differently for purposes of unit strengths. Continual negotiation over the years of the Vietnam era between the field commands and OSD attempted to refine troop counts in order to maximize the number of in-country military effectives under ceiling figures.

b. Accurate accounting required establishment of agreed base figures. The total in-country U.S. military population count of 31 December 1964 was ultimately selected. The Services conducted extensive reviews of past personnel actions in order to bring manpower space authorizations into line with actual on-board personnel requirements. This step was essential, as the practice had been to order personnel into South Vietnam in advance of publication of manpower authorization documents to minimize reaction time. One example of the effort required to verify and refine manpower requirements and authorizations should suffice. Between 16 and 26 May 1967 CINCPAC called a Program #4 accounting conference at his headquarters in Hawaii. In conjunction therewith, CINCPACFLT undertook to refine Navy deployments and to reconcile personnel on board in Vietnam with strength authorizations. Program #4 authorizations were compared with CNO's approved manpower allocations and in-country reported strengths. CINCPACFLT determined to develop a recommended activity listing by function suitable for use by all commands concerned with reporting and monitoring in-country personnel requirements and strengths, to which deployment authorizations as well as CNO billet authorizations could be related. OSD representatives at the CINCPAC Conference agreed that so long as the Navy remained within a 31 August 1966 adjusted base figure of 21,016 personnel and a total revised Program #4 figure of 30,039, the distribution among in-country activities was primarily a Service matter. CINCPACFLT made detailed recommendations to CNO<sup>19</sup> for the distribution of total authorized spaces to in-country activities and recommended realignment of manpower allocations accordingly. CNO reviewed the CINCPACFLT recommendations and then forwarded some 35 activity listings, covering the majority of in-country Navy activities that had manpower authorization documents, for use as the basis for Navy deployments in the Program #4 Plan.<sup>20</sup> He advised that action was being taken to align billet allocations with in-country authorizations as feasible. CNO stated: "The Program 4 Deployment Plan for Southeast Asia is the sole authority for force deployments ashore in SE Asia in support of U.S. military efforts in Vietnam."<sup>21</sup> He then advised that the Secretary of Defense had authorized the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard a combined manpower strength of 21,016 in-country Vietnam as of 31 August 1966, the Program #4 base date figure, and that the current Program #4 authorization increased this to a combined strength of 30,042, with 600 spaces approved for TDY personnel. Variation in accounting for personnel led to a disparity between

<sup>19</sup>Headquarters, Commander United States Navy Pacific Fleet, Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, Serial 6/00703, subject: Program #4 Strength Accounting Conference at CINCPACFLT Headquarters, 16-26 May; report of (U), 15 June 1967 (SECRET).

<sup>20</sup>Headquarters, United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to CINCPACFLT, Serial 00202P10, subject: Program #4 Authorization Accounting, Vietnam (U), 5 July 1967 (SECRET).

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

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CNO's figures and CINCPACFLT's totals of approximately 1,000 personnel. This number had to be compensated for by CINCPACFLT through reductions in individual activity or function strengths in the base figures used.

c. Based on definitive base figures and total program authorizations, detailed accounting to higher authority was required. An example of the extent of reporting required can be found in requirements imposed in connection with Program #6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined reporting requirements to COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Strike Command, the U.S. Army, Pacific, the Pacific Fleet, and the Pacific Air Force in a message on 15 August 1968.<sup>22</sup> As a matter of policy guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the reported actual in-country strength, consisting of operating strength, patients, and TDY personnel, would not exceed the approved force level of 549,500 military personnel. Army transients, replacements, and certain other categories would continue to be excluded from actual in-country strengths. All concerned were directed to take prompt action to establish procedures to keep the actual in-country strengths within the ceiling figures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended expansion of the civilianization program; deferment of scheduled deployments when possible; reduction in individual replacement flow; and reduction in use of TDY. A weekly strength report was to be submitted including the information shown below:

### Report Format

#### Weekly Strength Report:

Part 1 U.S. Forces	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>CG</u>	<u>Total</u>
A. MACV						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						
Subtotal						
B. Army Units						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						
Subtotal						
C. Marine Corps						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						
Subtotal						
D. Navy Units						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						
Subtotal						
E. Air Force Units						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						
Subtotal						
F. Miscellaneous Units						
(1) Combined Studies						
PCS						
(2) DOD Special Reps.						
(1) PCS						
(2) TDY						

<sup>22</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Message, 152243 August 1968, subject: Strength Accounting in South Vietnam, Program #6 (U), (SECRET).

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- (3) Defense Communication Agency
  - (1) PCS
  - (2) TDY
- (4) R&D ARPA
  - (1) PCS
  - (2) TDY
- (5) USASSG, ACSI
  - (1) PCS
  - (2) TDY
- (6) WTOP RVN/THAI

Total U.S.

Breakout Army: Operations  
Patients  
Intransits in  
Intransits out  
Replacements  
Returnees

Accountable TDY from out-of-country: (Authorization USA-500; USN-600; USMC-150; USAF-2700).

Note: The prescribed format continued with accounting for FWMAF.

### 8. SUMMARY

a. Force levels and military personnel requirements continued to be generated during the Vietnam era in a normal and well understood manner, as a result of assignment of missions and tasks. Major innovations were made in the review and decisionmaking process. Principal among these was establishment of a managerial system for definitive and detailed high-level, national control of military forces committed to SE Asia.

b. Numerous paramilitary objectives in Vietnam were effected, in part, by tailoring the total military forces authorized. The mechanism used was a series of comprehensive deployment programs issued from OSD that was binding upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services for purposes of manpower, budget, and logistical planning, and for troop and unit deployments. These programs were also used to control the interface of many military and nonmilitary projects, such as civilian/military substitution, use of contract personnel, and financial expenditures in support of military personnel in South Vietnam. The reporting and monitoring process ensured compliance by providing visibility up to the highest levels of DOD.

c. The administrative procedures and managerial control processes for the review and approval of military forces and manpower requirements were effective for the purposes for which they were devised. At times the system caused delays by requiring additional justification. At other times, it produced almost immediate response under clearly evident emergency situations, such as the Tet Offensive of 1968. The normal OSD use of the system in connection with a registered requirement was to provide a closely controlled, calculated response that was based upon careful analysis of effectiveness under OSD ground rules, with a view toward intermeshing the requirement with national policy and other continuing programs. Decisions were based on many considerations of which military ones were only a part. A dichotomy in objectives, or the understanding of those objectives, sometimes was apparent, with neither the civilian or military planner in complete accord and with considerable variance of opinion as to the best and most efficient methods for achieving them.

d. The U.S. objective in SE Asia has not been military victory in the historic sense, but the establishment of an environment free from external intrusion in which the South Vietnamese could establish a government system of their own choice. Military operations have

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been considered only as a necessary element in achieving that objective. Had the decisions promulgated to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff included details of the integration of programs that they effected, interrelationships would have been more understandable.

e. In order to arrive at decisions based upon a systems analysis approach, OSD often required submission of voluminous justification and, sometimes, rejustification of forces required. The principal behind this requirement was to provide decisionmakers with a series of options. The review process, upon occasion, inserted prolonged delays between the generation of a requirement and the ultimate decision on it. This delay sometimes required modification of desired tactics and strategy. Since the objective in South Vietnam was not military victory, decisionmakers in some cases may have assigned higher priority to actions other than rapid augmentation of military forces.

f. Because shifts in major military units required top-level approval, it was difficult to maintain complete flexibility in the field. It was not possible to call forth additional logistical military units from CONUS, or even to shift them within the PACOM theater, without coping with ceiling limitations and sometimes a Secretarial decision on the mix between civilian, contract, and military personnel. The conversion of military spaces to civilian was a requirement of later programs in order to bring additional military forces that were considered necessary into the country. The nature and locale of military support operations, periodic Government curfews applicable to civilians, and the right of civilians to strike meant that a civilian work force was not always as available as a military one would have been.

g. With the experience of the Cuban and Dominican Republic crises added to those of the war in SE Asia, it can be assured that similar national-level controls on deployment of military personnel might be imposed should the U.S. engage in another limited war. Political, social, and economic considerations had a much stronger effect on decisions of military force-levels and military activities than in previous situations. Planning included fundamental decisions affecting operations, force requirements, military manpower, and contingency planning. The interworking of military and civilian programs in Program Deployment Plans was apparent to the rank and file in the military largely by deduction. The interface between such programs should not only be part of the consideration in the decision process, but should be related in master plans available to those charged with their execution. Further, once having provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services with defined military objectives, OSD should accord greater flexibility within predetermined manpower ceilings for determination of such matters as force mix, timetables, and utilization of units.

## 9. CONCLUSIONS

a. The system devised by the Secretary of Defense for review and approval of military manpower requirements and programs during the Vietnam era was effective in achieving tight, centralized control of force deployments and monitoring compliance with in-country personnel ceilings. However, the complexity of the programs that the system attempted to integrate and the intricate interrelationship of the many diverse policies in effect usually caused unnecessary delays in approval of military programs and personnel requirements and required resorting to alternatives of less than optimum military desirability (paragraphs 1a and 3c).

b. Considerable difficulty was experienced by all concerned with the requirement for extensive justification that was part of the review and approval system in the case of major force requirements. The nature of justification involved exhaustive exploration of alternatives and options. This exploration often resulted in delays in authorization to prepare and deploy forces. With increased understanding on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and development of more sophistication in the use of the system, it proved capable of expeditious response in the case of fully justified requirements. Its necessity, however, is questionable in view of the unnecessarily lengthy, educative processes essential at all levels of command prior to initiation and acceptance of requirements (paragraphs 2, 3, and 6).

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c. The highly classified, detailed tables issued by the Secretary of Defense that establish in-country military manpower ceilings and are used for budget, logistic, and manpower planning in connection with the war in SE Asia resulted from detailed study of many views and recommendations. As issued, these tables provided no guidance or background information that could be used by the implementing Service to determine the rationale of decision and understanding of overall objectives (Appendixes A and B).

**CHAPTER IV**  
**SUMMARY**

## CHAPTER IV

### SUMMARY

1. **OVERVIEW.** The nature of the war in Vietnam and the policies under which it was fought were unique in a number of ways that had significant impacts on Service requirements to provide logistic support to combat forces. Three major factors that affected the ability of the Services to provide the required logistical military personnel and units were the rapid acceleration of the buildup; the decision not to call up the Reserves, upon whom much of the logistic support planning had been based; and 1-year tours. At times the impact of these three factors forced resorting to alternate, lesser plans to accomplish logistical support of the combat forces. In spite of the problems and difficulties, the essential support requirements of the Services were fulfilled.

a. The Services met the requirement to provide logistical personnel and support units during the buildup of combat forces in the Republic of Vietnam, but there were times when logistical military units and specialized and highly trained personnel were not readily available. Delays of this nature did not unduly jeopardize mission accomplishment by combat forces, but they did adversely affect the timeliness, efficiency, and effectiveness of logistic support; the management of resources in Vietnam that caused diversion of some combat personnel to logistic duties; and the degree of supervision of contractor activities. The use of civilians, civilian contractors, and civilian technicians to supplement military personnel and military logistical support units was an essential element of the overall capability to meet logistical support requirements in South Vietnam, particularly in the early period of the force buildup. Thereafter, the deliberate policy to hold military support personnel to a minimum resulted in a more extensive use of civilians. As indicated in other monographs, it was necessary at times to extend such support into areas and roles more suitably and effectively fulfilled by military units.

b. The delays in meeting requirements for military units and personnel resulted from a combination of factors. Principal among these was the decision made early in the buildup that Reserve forces would not be recalled to active duty. This decision made it particularly difficult, in some cases almost impossible, for the Army to respond to immediate requirements for combat service support units. The decision not to call up the Reserves had other less direct impacts as well. Availability of Reserve units and personnel would have permitted rapid response to newly developed requirements. The sustaining and training base in the continental United States would have been strengthened. Replacement of key personnel in activities outside SE Asia would have substantially reduced the severe degradation in unit readiness that resulted from successive personnel drawdowns in these activities.

c. The decision not to recall the Reserves and the necessary expansion of the military services to meet Vietnam requirements created the immediate need for emergency programs to train large numbers of newly recruited personnel. The organization and preparation of new units for combat operations diverted personnel from other equally essential activities and, in effect, made training establishments of many commands whose primary mission was readiness to meet contingencies in other parts of the world.

d. Logistical activities in South Vietnam often experienced shortages of personnel with specific skills and technical training. In some cases, skill categories were deficient in the numbers required because of the civilianization of CONUS military activities and the constant decline in the retention rate of experienced military personnel. Concurrent with the decision not to call the Reserves was the determination to continue normal separations. Consequently,



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discharges at the end of periods of obligated service, resignations, and retirements were continued as in peacetime. The Army was most severely restricted by this policy. The shortages of technically trained middle management military logisticians in such fields as petroleum, ammunition, transportation, supply, maintenance, data systems, and inventory management have been documented in the other monographs and volumes of the Joint Logistics Review Board.

e. Several manpower policies in effect during the Vietnam era reduced the free utilization of available military personnel. Among these were the 1-year tour with all of its ramifications, early release programs, rest and recuperation, and time limits on reexposure of Vietnam combat veterans. These policies had a favorable effect on military morale; however, they also contributed substantially to personnel turbulence throughout all the Services, since activities were continuously tapped for unexposed personnel to rotate to Vietnam and SE Asia. This turbulence, in turn, degraded readiness in both losing and gaining activities.

f. During the rapid buildup, new missions and tasks were assigned, often without basic lead time for essential personnel planning. This fact, coupled with the imposition of strictly enforced Service and overall ceilings on the numbers of military personnel in South Vietnam and SE Asia, contributed to delays in meeting personnel requirements for new logistical support organizations and to the expansion of existing ones. The Army's 1st Logistical Command, which was approved when supported troop strength was relatively low, arrived in Vietnam and found the supported troop strength so increased that its own authorized strength was completely unrealistic in terms of the logistical support it was required to provide. The Navy faced similar but lesser problems in meeting unanticipated responsibilities for the support of all U.S. and other Free World Military Assistance Forces ashore in I Corps Tactical Zone, and in support of inshore surveillance, river patrol, and mobile riverine operations.

g. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Services established systems to provide extensive and detailed justification of each requested increase in military personnel. These systems provided an effective means of achieving tight, centralized control of force deployments and of monitoring compliance with personnel ceilings. In some cases, such as the Tet Offensive of 1968, approvals were reached promptly. However, the systems were complex and often caused delays in the arrival of personnel units considered critical by field commanders to the discharge of assigned missions and tasks. Approval for Army logistical and engineer units was delayed by the detailed justification required by the personnel system. Despite the delays, no instance was found in which a commander indicated that logistical capability was degraded to the extent that an activity could not perform its mission. The efficiency and economy of that support was a different matter. In some cases, deficits in logistic capability, e.g., port and depot capabilities, resulted in problems that required several years to overcome.

h. The detailed review of military personnel by the Joint Logistics Review Board focused upon the use of military personnel in operational logistics. The review thus gave special attention to two primary topic areas:

- (1) Major Manpower Policies and Decisions
- (2) Generation of Force Requirements, The Review and Approval Process.

i. The preceding paragraphs have summarized the military personnel situation during the Vietnam era. The remaining paragraphs consist of a summary of lessons learned and the major recommendations that were developed.

## 2. MAJOR MANPOWER POLICIES AND DECISIONS

### a. Lessons Learned

(1) The decision not to call up Reserve forces, which effectively eliminated that source of trained personnel, indicated that contingency planning by the Services should provide alternatives that do not include the Reserve forces.

## PERSONNEL

(2) Extensive use of civilian personnel was necessary in Vietnam, both as an interim measure and to augment military personnel in order to improve responsiveness of the required logistic support.

(3) Vietnam experiences again demonstrated that adequate lead time is required for the Services to plan, procure, and train logistical personnel. The time is particularly critical in the case of certain highly specialized, long-lead-time personnel and those logistical personnel who are needed to meet initial requirements. The requirement for lead time emphasized the importance of evaluating the long-range impacts of rigid personnel policies. Policies such as the 1-year tour of duty, guaranteed rest and recuperation, and nonutilization of pipeline personnel must be evaluated in advance of implementation, since they cause restrictions on the ready availability of skilled and experienced personnel.

(4) The extensive civilian staffing of logistics activities in CONUS detracted in varying degrees, by Service and by skills, from the adequacy of the training base for military personnel and its ability to provide trained military personnel either to meet initial requirements of the contingency or to ensure rotational flow of replacements.

### b. Recommendations

(MP-1) Contingency planning include alternatives that provide efficient logistical manpower resources in the event that Reserve forces are not mobilized.

(MP-2) The Services review selected current and proposed contingency plans and evaluate the supportive personnel policies to ensure that an adequate training and rotational base by skill category is provided.

(MP-3) The Services develop and initiate plans and policies for restructuring the Active Forces to the extent necessary to provide the highly specialized, long-lead-time logistical personnel to meet requirements imposed by contingency plans.

## 3. GENERATION OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS, THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS

### a. Lessons Learned

(1) There were valid requirements for ceiling controls of military personnel in the Services and for the total of those deployed in Vietnam. The justification and approval process, which evolved from peacetime procedures, was complex and went into details well beyond those that appear to have been necessary for overall control. Satisfying these details often required a major and extensive effort in the theater of operations, contributed to delays in meeting requirements for increased logistic support, and detracted from the flexibility of the responsible commanders. In the enforcement of exact in-country ceilings, requirements were imposed for extremely precise reporting. Further complications were changes in ground rules and early uncertainties as to the criteria of judgment being applied in Washington. During a conflict situation every effort should be made to simplify the procedures of justification, review, and approval of personnel increases and to provide a maximum of flexibility to the responsible commanders to the extent consistent with the needs of overall control.

(2) The Vietnam experience highlighted the importance of a complete understanding at all levels of the justification and approval system in use, and the criteria of judgment.

**APPENDIX A**  
**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GENERATION OF**  
**FORCE REQUIREMENTS, THE REVIEW**  
**AND APPROVAL PROCESS**

(This appendix is classified and is bound separately.)

**APPENDIX B**  
**SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM #5**

(This appendix is classified and is bound separately.)

**APPENDIX C**  
**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

## APPENDIX C

### LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A&amp;AFES</b>	<b>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</b>
<b>ABFC</b>	<b>Advanced Base Functional Component</b>
<b>AC&amp;W</b>	<b>Aircraft Control and Warning</b>
<b>ADC</b>	<b>Air Defense Command</b>
<b>AFB</b>	<b>Air Force Base</b>
<b>AFDP</b>	<b>Army Force Deployment Plan</b>
<b>AFLC</b>	<b>Air Force Logistics Command</b>
<b>AFR</b>	<b>Air Force Regulation</b>
<b>AFRes</b>	<b>Air Force Reserves</b>
<b>AID</b>	<b>Agency for International Development</b>
<b>AIT</b>	<b>Advanced Individual Training</b>
<b>AMC</b>	<b>Army Materiel Command</b>
<b>ANG</b>	<b>Air National Guard</b>
<b>ARVN</b>	<b>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</b>
<b>ASD (M)</b>	<b>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)</b>
<b>ASD (SA)</b>	<b>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)</b>
<b>BCT</b>	<b>Basic Combat Training</b>
<b>BLSG</b>	<b>Brigade Logistics Support Group</b>
<b>BOB</b>	<b>Bureau of the Budget</b>
<b>CB</b>	<b>Construction Battalion</b>
<b>CEC</b>	<b>Civil Engineer Corps</b>
<b>CETS</b>	<b>Contract Engineering &amp; Technical Services</b>
<b>CFS</b>	<b>Contract Field Services</b>
<b>CHNAVPERS</b>	<b>Chief of Naval Personnel</b>
<b>CINCLANTFLT</b>	<b>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet</b>
<b>CINCPAC</b>	<b>Commander in Chief, Pacific</b>
<b>CINCPACFLT</b>	<b>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</b>
<b>CINCSTRIKE</b>	<b>Commander in Chief, STRIKE Command</b>
<b>CINCUSARPAC</b>	<b>Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific</b>
<b>CNO</b>	<b>Chief of Naval Operations</b>
<b>COMNAVFORV</b>	<b>Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam</b>
<b>COMSERVPAC</b>	<b>Commander, Service Force, Pacific</b>
<b>COMUSMACTHAI</b>	<b>Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand</b>

## PERSONNEL

COMUSMACV	Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
COSTAR	Combat Support of the Army
CSI	CONUS Sustaining Increment
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
DA	Department of the Army
DAN	Deployment Adjustment Notification
DAR	Deployment Adjustment Requests
DCNO (P&P)	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy)
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
FLC	Force Logistics Command
FLSG	Force Logistics Support Group
FMF	Fleet Marine Forces
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FRN	Force Requirement Number
FSR	Field Service Representatives (Air Force)
FSR	Force Service Regiment (Marine)
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Five Year Defense Program
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
LANTFLT	Atlantic Fleet
LN	Local National
LSG	Logistic Support Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MATS	Military Air Transport Command
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MTMTS	Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
MWSG	Marine Wing Service Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMCB	Navy Mobile Construction Battalion
NSA	Naval Support Activity .

## PERSONNEL

0-1, 0-2, 0-3	Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTRA	Other than Regular Army
PA&E	Pacific Architectural and Engineering, Inc.
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCR	Program Change Request
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
RECON	Readiness Condition
RMCB	Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion
RMK-BRJ	Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RRMRP	Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool
RVN	Republic of South Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of South Vietnam, Air Force
SDB	Skill Development Base
SE Asia	Southeast Asia
SEAPRO	Southeast Asia Programming Office
STRAF	Strategic Army Forces
TA	Tables of Allowances
TCN	Third Country National
TD	Tables of Distribution
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/O&E	Tables of Organization and Equipment
TTPPS	Trainees, Transients, Patients, Prisoners, Students
UMD	Unit Manning Document
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Force, Europe
USAMC	United States Army Materiel Command
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WESTPAC	Western Pacific



**APPENDIX D**  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

## APPENDIX D

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